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JAMES B. WHITE

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A
WAY OF TALKING ABOUT PEOPLE:
A STUDY OF ROBINSON AND
MATLOCK

One way to regard what the Supreme Court has done in the cases
it has decided under the Fourth Amendment is to say that it has
created a specialized discourse of adjudication, a language in which
it can talk about and dispose of the repeated conflicts that arise betveen an officer engaged in the process of crime control and a citizen upon whose freedom or security he intrudes. The events which
bring these two figures together are bewildering in their variety
and complexity, and the claims on each side are deeply felt and
strenuously made. It has not been easy for the Court to work out a
coherent way of addressing these conflicts, and the cases accordingly reflect a considerable amount of uncertainty and confusion, especially if one examines the particular results. Can there be found,
James B. White is Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
This paper has benefited substantially from the careful criticism of my colleague Professor James E. Scarboro, who brought me to task on important matters both of analysis and expression, and from that of Professor Geoffrey Stone,
who likewise made valuable suggestions. Neither of these readers is of course
responsible for the defects that remain, or for the conclusions reached. I should
also say that my view of the Fourth Amendment has no doubt been influenced by
Professor Lloyd Weinreb, whose book on criminal process I have frequently used
in class.
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behind the complex and inconsistent surface of the cases, any general continuities of attitude, any agreed-upon and more or less permanent ways of defining the roles of officer and suspect and of
regulating the relationship between them? Such definitions-if they
existed in forms of which one could approve-would constitute an
important social and intellectual resource, potentially serving as an
expression of value and attitude of a far more stable and enduring
kind than might at first be thought possible from examination of the
cases themselves. I propose to trace some of the difficulties the Court
has faced in trying to fashion a coherent discourse of Fourth
Amendment adjudication, and to identify certain continuities of
attitude. It is against this background that I examine United States
v. Robinson1 and United States v. Matlock,2 as contributions to the
discourse of the Fourth Amendment.
What I mean by a "discourse of adjudication" that defines and
regulates the relationship between officer and suspect may perhaps
be made clearer if one imagines a typical Fourth Amendment case:
a serious crime has occurred, such as robbery or rape; a policeman
has stopped a suspect, and searched him and his car, perhaps finding
evidence, perhaps not. The person searched wants to talk about this
event in a language of legal significance, in a motion to suppress or
in a civil action against the officer. The discourse of the Fourth
Amendment-the conventional ways of characterizing facts, stating
values, and articulating criteria of judgment-constitutes the language he must use, and he will demand of it that it speak to the
situation in a way that he can respect. On the other side, the representative of the state, speaking for the officer and the victim in opposition, must use the same language, and he will likewise demand
that it respect what he regards as the important concerns he stands
for. One way to conceive of the task of the Court in this field, then,
is to say that it is to define and regulate the relationship between
policeman and citizen, through the thousands of different forms and
factual situations in which conflicts can arise between them, by
affording a language in which their representatives can carry on
intelligible argument about the transaction that they share, and in
which, so far as possible, justice is done to the legitimate claims and
expectations of both sides. Central to the process of creating such
a language are judgments as to what claims and expectations are
1414 U.S. 218 (1973).

2 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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"legitimate," and in making these the Court defines the citizen and
officer in important ways. Indeed the making of such a language of
adjudication, setting the terms in which argument will proceed, is
one way in which the Court contributes to the definition and the
education of a national community.
To the extent that the officer, the suspect, and those who readily
identify with either, can find in that language an expression or recognition of what they regard as their important concerns, the discourse functions as an important force of social definition and cohesion, placing the individual or official in a comprehensible public
world in ways that he can respect. But to the extent that the individual or official faces a public world defined by a language he
cannot speak, in which he cannot locate himself, which does not
deal in intelligible ways with claims he regards as important, the
discourse can be said to be one of authority rather than community,
3
its force divisive rather than cohesive.
To put it slightly differently, the decision of a Fourth Amendment case is a point at which a judgment is made as to how people
will be talked about in our public world. In deciding a case, the
Court makes an example of a certain set of people and the transaction in which they have participated; it writes a drama, as it were,
of public significance. The language in which this is done should be
regarded as much more than a technical or professional language,
to be evaluated by its clarity, precision, and efficiency. It is a social
and intellectual force of enormous significance, a critical expression
of value and attitude in some ways more important to the quality of
the community it defines than the particular decisions taken under
3

It is worth emphasizing that this language is compulsory in a very practical
way. Anyone who wishes to employ the machinery of the law to assert a right
or to protect an interest must speak it. He need not mean what he says, of course,
but he is nevertheless forced to participate in a rhetorical process designed to
express certain more or less clearly articulated values, whether or not he agrees
with them. It can even be said that one of the functions of the law is to provide
a rhetorical coherence to public life, to compel those who disagree about one
thing to speak a language which expresses their actual or pretended agreement
about everything else. By compelling agreement in this way the law makes the
disagreement both intelligible and amenable to resolution; it establishes in the
real world an idealized conversation. I do not suggest that this compulsion is a
bad thing-indeed it seems essential unless every case is to raise as a wholly new
question how our society and its members are to be talked about-but it does
seem important to recognize its force, and that it has both highly creative and
highly fictional aspects.
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Such a discourse of adjudication is a measure of a civilization.
In attempting to define and regulate the relationship between
officer and suspect, through example and principle, the Court does
not of course start with a clean slate, free to invent what it will,
but must function within an existing intellectual tradition. First,
then, I shall identify briefly the major characteristics of the rhetorical situation in which the Court finds itself, the principal "givens"
with which it must deal-by which I mean more than the matters
that are authoritatively disposed of by others (for these are not
many); I mean the structural tensions and problems that are built
into the role and situation of the Court when it comes to the adjudication of Fourth Amendment questions.
it.4

4 Perhaps I should say in slightly greater detail why I put such emphasis on
the condition of the discourse. It would, after all, be possible to take the view
that what really matters in our world is not the way lawyers and judges talk
about the rights of citizens under the Fourth Amendment, but what they do
about them. On this view, one interested in the state of our civilization ought
not look to the way these matters are thought and argued about but to the ways
in which policemen and judges and prison officials behave in fact. I am far from
suggesting that such investigations are of no importance-they may among other
things show that a particular public rhetoric is in important ways hypocritical
or false to experience-but I think the suggested line between "saying" and "doing" cannot be drawn in the simple way suggested. For one thing, the investigator
of the "reality," who disregards what the legal system "says" and examines what
it "does," must himself have a language in which to describe and judge what he
sees, and his language can be criticized and evaluated, much as I suggest legal
discourse can. That is, he must make distinctions as to fact and value, and these
can be argued about. Also, common experience tells us that there must be some
ways, however elusive and difficult to trace, in which the quality of legal discourse affects the nature of the "real-world" decisions taken under it. While no
one claims that differences in language work themselves out automatically in
judgment, we can imagine languages of adjudication-using criteria of race or
height, for example-which would be less likely to lead to results of which we
would approve than our own relatively civilized system, however imperfect it
might be. And there are effects of the discourse beyond mandatory limitation or
direction: a good system trains its judges and lawyers to certain standards and
ideals; it legitimizes certain sets of claims and appeals-which can then be employed as resources of thought and argument; and it disapproves of others. One
possible response to a person who insists upon the importance of what he calls
"reality" over mere language is to say that a public system of discourse, such
as the law is, is itself an important reality, a social and intellectual fact in the
life of our society with independent force and significance. And the significance,
especially of constitutional discourse, can be claimed to run far beyond the
courtroom, for this language has as its most general purpose the definition both
of a national community and of the relationship between that community and
its members. It is not too much to say that legal discourse functions as a force
that educates, for good or evil, those who must employ it.
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OF THE

FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. ADDRESSING THE OFFICER AND CITIZEN UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: THE DEFINITION OF ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP

I begin with the point of view of the officer. His claim is that
the law ought to recognize the difficulty and uncertainty of his job
by giving the greatest possible range to the exercise of his expert
judgment as to when a stop or search or arrest ought to be made,
and as to what ought to be done next. To the extent that the courts
require that these judgments ultimately be judicial ones, or judicially reviewable, his claim shifts slightly, to an insistence that if the
courts are to decide these matters they should promulgate clear and
specific rules that the police can reasonably follow. Only if there
are such rules can any punitive or deterrent sanction-such as the
exclusionary rule as it is now understood-be sensible or fair. Attempts to frame such rules, however, have foundered on several
stubborn realities: the complexity of the factual experiences with
which they are concerned; the discovery that rules employing clear
and general categories, or making highly specific directions, will
sacrifice legitimate concerns either of the criminal justice system
or of individuals; and the great diversity of attitude on substantive
questions among the members of the-Supreme Court, making the
necessary agreement difficult. The result has been an uncertain and
confusing body of cases and principles which fail to provide the
sort of guidance the police understandably demand. What is worse,
from their point of view, these uncertain directions are enforced
by a unitary deterrent sanction-exclusion of evidence-without
any regard to the degree to which an officer knew or should have
known that what he was doing was wrong. 5 It is not surprising that
5 There is some movement away from this conception of the exclusionary rule.
See the dissent of Chief Justice Burger in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415-19 (1971), in which one of
the bases for attacking the exclusionary rule is its failure to make "rationally
graded responses" to misconduct. In Michigan v. Tucker, 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974),
the Court faced a case in which an interrogation had taken place before the
Miranda case was decided: the trial afterward. In holding that the statement obtained should not be excluded for failure to give the warnings, the Court took
the view that Miranda applied to the case, under the holding of Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), but that the exclusionary rule should not apply to
the violation because it could not be said that the officer's failure to give the
warnings was either willful or negligent. In these circumstances, the deterrent
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the police, and those who readily identify with them, feel unfairly
treated.

The Court has not been much more successful in talking about
the other major participant in the transaction, the citizen who complains of his treatment by the police. At one time property law was
apparently conceived of as drawing a bright line around the individual, defining in relatively clear and certain terms a zone of autonomy and privacy. If there was no trespass, there was no search

and the Fourth Amendment did not apply., On the other hand, no
search whatever was permitted except for items in which the state
or another had a superior property interest, such as stolen goods or
contraband. 7 Understandably enough, the Court has not found the

first formulation sufficiently protective of individual privacy," especially in an era of sophisticated electronic devices. And the second
formulation is excessively restrictive of legitimate state interests in
searching for and seizing evidence.9 But attempts to produce a
body of "privacy" law to supplement or supplant the use of property concepts have not been successful. There is one strain in the
opinions which reduces Fourth Amendment adjudication to a process of identifying and balancing the competing "interests" of the
citizen and the state.' But this is bound to be an empty or misleadrationale of exclusion cannot sensibly apply. While this can be regarded as a
manufactured holding-Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred on the ground
that Miranda should not be applied to this interrogation, and Mr. Justice Stewart
said that the opinions really held the same thing-it does suggest that the application of the exclusionary rule ought to be in some respect dependent upon
the degree of fault of the officer, which seems, after all, only sensible and fair.
The Court's reference to "willfulness or negligence" does not adequately address,
however, the problem of how fault should be measured. In order not to encourage ignorance of relevant cases by law enforcement personnel, the appropriate standard should be this: If a reasonable person, fully acquainted with the
Supreme Court and relevant lower federal court cases, should reasonably have
known the conduct was forbidden, the exclusionary rule should properly apply,
otherwise not. For a different test of "reasonableness" in a civil action, see Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339,
1348 (2d Cir. 1972).
60 lmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
8 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9

Warden v.Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).

10See, e.g., the majority opinions in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967),

and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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ing exercise unless there is some agreement on what "interests" are
important and why, and some agreed way of reconciling them when
they conflict. The beguiling metaphor of calculation implicit in
such terminology is, after all, a metaphor and not the definition of
rationality itself. It can only work if we have some prior language
to define what is to be subjected to that process. This approach
has the danger of becoming a sort of universal solvent, operating
as a technique for resolving all constitutional questions without
much regard for the choices authoritatively expressed in the language of that document itself.
A somewhat similar movement from apparent clarity to a recognition of complexity has occurred in the administration of "probable cause" and "reasonable search" limitations. Once it was said
that the police could in no way interfere with an individual's liberty or privacy without "probable cause" and a judicial warrant
where practicable (at least in search cases). In the key cases of
Terry v. Ohio," and Camara v. Municipal Court,12 the Supreme
Court has broken down that formulation, and it is now plain that
some detentions and some searches can be carried on with less than
probable cause; and even that judicial warrants for searches, and
perhaps detentions, may in some cases issue on less than probable
cause.' 3 We may be on the threshold of a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in which the only question is whether the Supreme Court
believes a police practice to be "reasonable." No one can know
what meaning will be given such a term, just as no one can know
what "privacy" will be made to mean.
A citizen who prided himself on living under the protection of
a set of specific constitutional guarantees-or an officer who wanted
clear direction and a recognition of the importance of his enterprise-could understandably be confused and worried by what he
can see and anticipate. Not only are the rules generally unclear;
there is a fundamental uncertainty both as to how the basic values
of the Fourth Amendment should be expressed-in terms of property, privacy, "protected interests," or some other way-and how
the authority to interfere with those values should be defined.
11392

U.S. 1 (1968).

12 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

13 See the suggestion made in dictum in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727
(1969).
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B. THE STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
DISCOURSE

At the beginning there was the language of the Fourth Amendment itself. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." Two things are apparent from the language. First, it is incomplete; such key terms as "search," "seizure," and "probable
cause" can be given meaning only through historical context or
innovation. Second, the relationship between the two clauses is unclear.' 4
I take up the second point first. One possible reading is that the
primary prohibition is against "unreasonable searches and seizures"
under standards of reasonableness to be evolved by the Court; and
that the "probable cause" and other specific requirements of the
second clause are taken as constitutional definitions of reasonableness only in that class of cases where warrants happen to be obtained. The difficulty with such a reading is that under it an officer
would never be required to obtain a warrant, and it would make
the protections of the warrant clause pointless if they could be
evaded at the officer's will.1 5 To give meaning to the warrant clause
14 The form of the Amendment actually adopted by the House of Representatives in 1789 was somewhat different. The two clauses were connected by
having the central language read "shall not be violated by 'warrants issuing without probable cause." (Emphasis added). But the version received and ratified by
the Senate, and adopted by the states, was the version we now have, the change
having been made by the reporting committee. LASsoN, HISTORY AND DEvwoPmENT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 101 (1937). It
cannot be the "intention of the framers" in any specific sense, then, that we
seek to advance in analyzing and giving meaning to this language, but our own
interest in the coherence and intelligibility of the fundamental instrument of our
government. That this was not meant to be language of great precision seems
plain from the looseness with which "fundamental rights" were talked about
both in the political arguments of the time and in such particular constitutional
provisions as the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
15 On the reading suggested in the text, one incentive to obtain a warrant
might still remain, that of reducing exposure to criminal and civil liability. This
was in fact one of the primary functions of the warrant procedure when it first
evolved. See 2 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF TME CROWN chs. 10-13 (1736).
Can it be that the original intention was to leave the officer free to choose which
sort of search or seizure to carry out, subject to the requirements of the warrant
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it seems necessary that, in some cases at least, a warrant be required,
but there are no criteria in the language of the Amendment for defining the scope and degree of the requirement. This suggests another reading. Assume that the heart of the Amendment lies in the
warrant clause rather than the "reasonableness" clause and requires
that a warrant be obtained for any search or seizure, unless for
good reason excused, and, wherever a warrant is so excused, that
the same standards of probable cause and specificity, so far as possible, be applied. That is, under this reading "reasonableness"
would be defined by the criteria of the warrant clause-probable
cause, specificity, and the implicit warrant requirement-which are
presumed to apply to every search. When the direct application
of the clause is excused, as where an emergency excuses the warrant requirement, its criteria still operate as standards or guides for
the evaluation of searches. Although there has been some argument
both as to its historical basis and as to its wisdom, it is pretty much
this reading the Court adopted when, upon the passage of farreaching federal criminal laws-especially prohibition laws-it began
to work out a meaning for the Fourth Amendment."

1. What is a search? In Ohnstead v. United States,17 the Court
seemed to define a "search" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment as a "trespass" and accordingly held that wiretapping involved
no violation of Fourth Amendment rights. But it never said how a
trespass was to be defined. Is this to be a matter of state property
law, federal common law, or some combination of the two? The
question of the role of state property law in defining the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment was evaded in two cases
that seemed to raise it, Chapman v. United States,18 involving a
landlord's right to enter a tenant's premises, and Stoner v. California,19 involving a hotel clerk's power to consent to a police
search of a rented hotel room. Neither case presented the issue
squarely and each was decided without any intimation by the
Court as to the power of the state to authorize such searches
clause if a warrant were obtained, subject to trespass laws under common law
standards and to general constitutional criteria of "reasonableness" if not?
0

1

See, e.g.,

LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT

TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 38-50 (1969).

17 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

19 376 US. 483 (1964).

18 365 U.S. 610 (1961).

43

(1966);

174

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1974

through declarations of property law, or as to the standards by
which such declarations would be examined.
When Olrnstead was abandoned in the series of cases culminating in Katz v. United States2°-which held that the Fourth Amendment "protected people, not places" and used a language of "privacy" instead of (or in addition to) a language of property to define the sort of intrusion regulated by it-whatever clarity the law
had had was gone. Who is to determine what is a "privacy" interest for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and under what
criteria? To what extent, if any, is this to be at least initially a
question of state law? 2 ' If there is to be a federal law of privacy,
what shall be its bases, its terms, and its contours?
Particularly difficult, under either a "property" or a "privacy"
language, is the analysis of those cases where an individual shares
premises, belongings, or communications with another private person-a landlord, a hotel clerk, a roommate, a spouse, a hildng companion, a neighbor-who then consents to a search. Under what
circumstances has that other person such a power over whatever
is "private" that he can authoritatively consent to its search and
seizure by the police? What relevance has state law of property,
contract, and agency in determining the terms of the "sharing" and
the nature of authority granted? Is the situation different when the
person with whom the "sharing" takes place is not a private person
but a police agent pretending to be a private person? This question
shades into the use of secret agents and spies. Is it an invasion of
privacy subject to Fourth Amendment regulation when a secret
agent is planted in cne's business office, one's church, or one's law
firm? When the meterman, the auto mechanic, or the garbage collector are paid to report on one's activities?
2. What is an arrest? What is a seizure? A perhaps more surprising omission has been the Court's failure over the years to tell us
what was an "arrest" of the sort requiring probable cause, and what
should be done with detentions short of such an arrest: were these
to be permitted freely, subject to no Fourth Amendment regulation; prohibited entirely, unless probable cause existed; or subjected
to intermediate regulation, and if so under what authority? In
20

389 U.S. 347 (1967).

21 For a case continuing to give independent Fourth Amendment protection
to the ownership of property, see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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Henry v. United States,22 the Court seemed to assume that any interference with liberty was an "arrest" requiring probable cause.
In Rios v. United States,23 the Court backed away from this view
and held that when an "arrest" occurred, and by implication whether one did, were to be regarded as matters of "fact." But it gave the
trier of fact no criteria by which to approach, let alone resolve, the
question.
This uncertainty was in part resolved by Terry v. Ohio, which
held that some interferences with liberty-in this case a frisk for
weapons and the detention necessary to complete that frisk-would
be regarded as "seizures" distinct from "arrests," and therefore not
requiring "probable cause." But Terry also held that these interferences were subject to Fourth Amendment regulation under its
first clause, prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures." The
idea was that of the universe of "seizures" some were "arrests,"
regulated by the probable cause requirement; others were "less than
arrests," regulated by the first clause. This analysis does not work
so well, as a practical or linguistic matter, with respect to "searches."
What kind of search is less than a search? And it raises considerable
question both as to the place of the warrant requirement and its
commands of probability and specificity. In what searches and seizures will probable cause and the warrant not be required, and under
what criteria of reasonableness will they be regulated? Terry suggests that at least in "frisk" cases both the specificity requirement
(limiting the frisk to an external pat-down of the sort that would
reveal a weapon) and a depreciated version of the probable cause
requirement (requiring "arffculable suspicion" that the person is
armed) should apply. But this does not tell us what to do with other
cases. And its result, inconsistent with the earlier reading of the
relationship between the two clauses, is that an officer alone can do
what a judge could not, under the probable cause language, authorize him to do.
3. How is "probable cause" to be measured? There is an enormous body of law giving a complicated and somewhat uncertain
content to the "probable cause" language,2 4 varying especially in
the methods by which the requisite probability is to be measured
22 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
24

23 364 U.S. 253 (1960).

Compare, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), 'with United

States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
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and established. Virtually all these cases, however, agree on one
thing. Probable cause permitting a search or arrest requires good
basis for believing it probable or likely that the particular search
contemplated will produce the items legitimately sought, or that the
particular person arrested has in fact committed a crime for which
arrest is permissible. In making and reviewing determinations of
probable cause a court functions as a sort of trier of fact, asking
a particular question about a particular case: does the evidence
properly before it support the conclusion of probability to the
requisite degree? This is the general approach used even in Terry
v. Ohio to determine whether the particular facts of the case justified the frisk engaged in there.
In Camara v. Municipal Court 5 a different conception of the
"probable cause" judgment was employed for the first time, with
consequences that can hardly be measured. On first reading, that
case may seem to add to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
It overruled Frank v. Maryland26 and held that an administrative
inspection of a residence in order to determine whether it complied
with housing code requirements was a "search" subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected
the argument that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because it
was a "civil" search carried out as part of an administrative scheme
and not meant to further a criminal prosecution. But in requiring
a warrant the Court created added difficulty. In the normal case
there will be no specific reason to believe that a particular house is
substandard. Indeed, the purpose of such schemes is to inspect whole
neighborhoods or even cities to uncover dangers of which even the
occupants may be unaware. The Court had to choose between
invalidating these obviously valuable inspections or interpreting
"probable cause," for the first time, to require evidence not of some
degree of probability with respect to the particular invasion, but
of the reasonableness of the scheme as a whole. The latter was the
view adopted by the Court. In Camara, the standard for the issuance of the warrant is not the probability test articulated in the
27
warrant clause, but a general "reasonableness" standard.
25 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

26 359 U.S. 360 (1959).

27 The Court said: "'[P]robable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect must exist
if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which
will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the
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This case led to a suggestion in the majority opinion in Davis v.

Mississippi28 that warrants might issue to compel the production

of fingerprints-and perhaps voice exemplars, attendance at lineups,
and other material such as blood samples, hair clippings, and the
like-all on less than probable cause. This intimation was quickly
taken up by the drafters of Proposed Rule of Criminal Procedure
41.1,20 which would permit judicial "orders" (not warrants) for
some items on less than probable cause, although this seems plainly
inconsistent with the express language of the Constitution. Finally,
in Ahneida-Sanchez v. United States,30 a concurring opinion-necessary to the existence of a majority disapproval of discretionary
stops and searches by "roving border patrol" officers on less than
probable cause-held that warrants may properly issue, on the
authority of Camara, authorizing border patrol officers to stop
whomsoever they wished in large zones near international borders,
upon a showing that this practice is reasonably necessary to the
curtailment of illegal entry by aliens, and without requiring that
the particular stop be justified by particular facts presenting particular probabilities. Here the Court has legitimized a practice not
enormously different from the writs of assistance-authorizing officers to search where they wished for smuggled goods-against
which the Fourth Amendment was specifically directed." The conpassage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house),
or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon
specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling." 387 U.S. at 538.
Left open here is the effect of this new definition of "probable cause" on other
kinds of cases. The new standard is here employed where no warrant was required before, and perhaps the Court should be taken as inventing a new sort
of instrument, a warrant on less than traditional probable cause, as a new implementation of the reasonableness requirement. The quotation marks around
the term "probable cause" in the passage quoted support such a view. But what
should be the occasions upon which this new instrument is appropriate? The
opinion suggests certain factors upon which a limitation might be constructed:
the civil purpose of the search; the apparent requirement of prior notice; and
the protection against inappropriate discrimination. But as the cases described
in the text make clear, no such limitations have been coherently devised and
imposed by the Court.
28 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
20 52 F.R.D. 409, 462 (1971). Colorado has adopted a rule permitting a court
order for fingerprinting on less than probable cause. CoLo. R. CRIM. P. 41.1.
30413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973).
31 One possibly significant difference is that the search authorized by AlmeidaSanchez is that of a car, not of a house. The use of the word "house" in the
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stitutional definition of reasonableness expressed in the details of
the warrant clause was abandoned here, and the Fourth Amendment was read as though it prohibited "unreasonable searches and
seizures" without more.
The point of these remarks has not been to claim that Terry and
Camara are diabolical cases-indeed it is difficult to see how they
could properly have been decided differently on their facts-but to
trace the impact they have had on the probable cause and warrant
protections of the Fourth Amendment, removing some classes of
search and seizure from those protections altogether and, at least
in some cases, changing the fundamental nature of the probable
cause inquiry. The question remains whether these cases could have
been justified in ways less destructive of Fourth Amendment
traditions.
One possible starting point is the fact that both Terry and Camara
involved not searches for evidence or fruits of crime, but intrusions made for quite other purposes: to protect the life of the officer
and to discover hazardous conditions in the house. Would it be a
sensible reading of the Fourth Amendment to hold that searches
carried out for such protective purposes as these are to be regulated
under the "reasonableness" standard of the first clause rather than
the probability and specificity criteria of the second? Presumably
those criteria would continue to be relevant to any evaluation of
reasonableness, but not determinative as they are in criminal
searches. The ultimate question would be whether there is a plain
social need for the intrusion, and whether the search engaged in was
narrowly tailored to its purposes. This seems to have been the conception of reasonableness employed in the cases. In Terry the frisk
was limited to one that would uncover weapons that might present
a danger, and was valid only because the officer could substantiate
his suspicion that this particular person might be armed. Camara
required that the inspection be on an area-wide or other systematic
basis, thus removing the dangers of discrimination which seem to
Amendment itself may support a greater protection for homes than vehicles. See
the discussion of Chambers v. Maroney and Vale v. Louisiana in the text infra,
at notes 39-41. The search here would be greatly limited in scope by the fact that
its object is a person; intrusions into the glove compartment, a suitcase, or a bag
would presumably be invalid under any view expressed in the opinions.
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be part of what the Fourth Amendment opposes. Even more important, under Camara the householder is apparently entitled to
have the inspection take place at a reasonably convenient time,
which means that he has the opportunity to minimize the intrusion
enormously, by removing containers that he does not wish seen,
32
by suspending activities he does not wish observed, and so on.
If the suggested double standard were adopted, there would be
the danger that the opportunity to carry on protective searches,
regulated by the "reasonableness" clause, would be abused by officers in fact seeking evidence of crime where the standards of the
warrant clause are not met. One way to limit that possibility would
be to hold the "plain view" rule inapplicable to such intrusions, and
prohibit the use in a criminal proceeding of any item found in
such a search. This construction would permit, subject to the suggested use limitation, inspection of premises where fires had occurred (to discover the causes); compulsory medical tests and treatments when there was a danger of epidemic; the inspection of
luggage and the person as a condition upon the right to fly; the
stopping of automobiles for license and registration checks; and so
on. But the proposed warrants for compulsory revelation of evidence to assist criminal investigations would be invalid, as would
"detentions" for investigation. 3
The proposed distinction between two kinds of search-civil and
criminal-is meant to provide a way of making sense of the relationship between the clauses and to reconcile the legitimate demands of the community and the citizen sensibly and fairly. For
shorthand purposes, one might put it this way: "criminal" searches,
subject to the criteria of the warrant clause, should be regulated by
32 387 U.S. at 539-40. Professor LaFave has suggested that criminal sanctions
might still be imposed for an initial refusal, if it is ultimately found that the scheme
is reasonable. LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The
Camaraand See Cases, 1967 SuPRaEa
COURT Raviaw 1, 37. That of course need not,
and in light of the values expressed in Camara should not, be permissible.
33
The search for aliens illegally in the country would be a closer question. No
such search should be permitted for purposes of prosecuting the aliens for crime,
but I suppose deportation might be regarded as a civil sanction-akin to an order
to repair defective wiring uncovered during a housing inspection-though it seems
to me far closer to a criminal proceeding than that. In any event, under the proposed analysis, nothing uncovered during a search for aliens could be used in a
criminal proceeding.
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a "principle of particular justification," requiring a showing that
the probabilities on the facts of the individual case support the
specific search; "civil searches," regulated by the reasonableness
clause, should be subject to a "principle of general justification,"
requiring both a showing that the intrusion is supported by an overriding state interest in protecting people from serious harm, and
that the intrusion has been tailored as narrowly as possible consistent with that end.
To the extent that the proposed reading makes sense of the relationship between the clauses, it can be said to have the support of
the language of the Amendment. But can this reading be supported
by reference to its purposes and history? This is a difficult matter
explored at some length below. But I would here point to the conception of the Fourth Amendment that would justify an affirmative
response. The Amendment at its heart is not directed simply against
intrusions into privacy or property but against the official oppression and harassment of individuals and classes by intrusions of a
certain double character: using the power of the state first to compel
an entry or detention by force of arms or law; then to punish,
through criminal sanctions or forfeiture, the person whose world
has been so violated. In this sense (among others) the Fourth
Amendment and the Fifth Amendment have closely related purposes. They are primarily meant as ways of regulating the ways in
which the state may proceed criminally or punitively against its
citizens, not as a limitation upon civil obligations rationally imposed upon them. The paradigm injury with which the Amendment is concerned is not the search or seizure alone, but the use of
that power as a part of the criminal process. This view of the
Amendment supports both the proposed distinction between civil
and criminal searches and the abolition of the plain view rule as a
way of minimizing the impact of the civil search. This reading is of
course not free from difficulty, and I shall deal with some potential
objections later.
4. When is a warrantrequired?The reading the Court has given
the Fourth Amendment through most of its history has assumed the
primacy of the warrant clause. One natural corollary has been that
a search is valid only if made pursuant to a proper warrant, unless
an emergency or "exigency" exists which excuses that require-

A STUDY OF ROBINSON AND MATLOCK

181

ment.3 4 But in worldng out the implications of this formulation the
Court has met two problems of extreme difficulty.
The first is how the "exigent circumstances" which excuse a warrant are to be defined. In some opinions it seems implied that the
34 One's view of what circumstances should excuse the warrant requirement will
depend in large part on one's assessment of the purpose and efficacy of the warrant
mechanism itself, and on this point there has been some rather deep, though incompletely articulated, difference of opinion.
The classic statement is Justice Jackson's: "The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by
a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
The rejoinder, implicit in some of the opinions discussed below, admits the value
of judicial review of police decisions, but sees little to be gained in having that
review come before, rather than after, the intrusion. This view is supported by
doubts that the "independent magistrate" is in fact likely to be "independent" at all.
The major lines of justification are: First, one effect of the warrant procedure is
to freeze the story of the officer or his informant at a point well ahead of the arrest
or search. Thus even if it be true that the only substantial judicial review takes
place after the intrusion, that process will be far more accurate if based on facts
asserted before the intrusion, and not on a version possibly revised in the light of
later discoveries. Second, it is by no means realistic to assume that magistrates are
never "independent" and, to the extent that they are so, certain impermissible intrusions will be prevented. Third, to the extent that a magistrate is committed to the'
police view of the criminal process in general and of the case before him in particular, he still has an important function to perform: to advance the ultimate
success of the intrusion and the admissibility of the evidence obtained, he will take
pains to ensure that probable cause is adequately stated and that the other requirements of the warrant clause are met. Even deep-seated partisanship-if not coupled
vith an attitude of lawlessness-does not make the process of prior magistral review
a pointless one. Finally-an argument that had great appeal to Justice Frankfurter
-to require an officer to have a judiciar warrant, however improperly granted,
is to remain at least that symbolic step away from a police state, for the officer
acts not on his authority but that of a court.
With respect to arrests the Court has never required a warrant (though it has
occasionally spoken of a "preference" for such a warrant). No persuasive reason
has been given for the distinction between an arrest and a search-indeed, if there
is to be a distinction one might think it should go the other way-and it may rest
on no stronger ground than the apparent historical circumstance that a warrant has
generally not been required by the states or at common law for arrests for felonies
and certain misdemeanors. The notion may be that in an arrest situation there is
almost always a danger that the defendant may leave the jurisdiction while a
warrant is obtained, but that would not make sense in every case. For example,
when the officers leave the federal building to arrest someone where there has been
probable cause for days or weeks, one could sensibly require that they obtain
a warrant. At least one lower court has held that when an arrest is to take place
inside a residence, which will necessarily involve an intrusion into a house, a warrant
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categories of exigency are closed-the warrant is excused where the
search is incident to an arrest, of a movable vehicle, or pursuant to
consent 35-while others suggest that new categories can be added,
perhaps indefinitely. In Warden v. Hayden,36 for example, it was
held that an entry by police in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect
whom they had probable cause to arrest was valid, notvithstanding
the failure to obtain a warrant. In Schmverber v. California3 7-the
blood test case-it was said that a warrant could be excused where
there was danger that evidence would be lost or destroyed. The
danger is, of course, that the exception will eat up the rule. Is there
not always a danger that what one is searching for may be moved
or destroyed?
Attempts to employ sharp categories have not, however, been
wholly successful. Carrollv. United States"5 established the proposition that the search of a car on the highway could be carried out
without a warrant if there were probable cause, for the obvious
reason that the car might be driven away while a warrant was applied for. But in Chambers v. Maroney39 this principle was applied
to permit the warrantless search of a car that had been impounded
by the police, for the search of which there was obviously plenty
of opportunity to get a warrant. Is the rule then to be an "exigency"
rule, requiring a showing that the vehicle or other item to be
searched is in fact in some danger of being moved? Or a "car" rule,
simply permitting warrantless searches of cars, and if so, on what
grounds? 40 The major argument in support of Chambers is that
where a car is involved there will be an actual exigency in such a
large percentage of the cases that the Court will not stop to inquire
whether one exists in a particular case. But this raises a large question about Fourth Amendment adjudication. Is it proper for the
should normally be required. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir.
1970). This seems a sensible position, but the Supreme Court has never so held. The
failure to require a warrant for arrests where a warrant would be practicable stands
as an unexplained anomaly of Fourth Amendment law. For further discussion of
this problem, see Barrett, PersonalRights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendnent, 1960 SupaEME COURT REVIEW 46.
3
5 See, e.g., the plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
36 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
38 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
37 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
39 399 U.S.42 (1970).
40
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971), Mr. Justice
Stewart said: "The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears." But see Cady v. Dombrowksi, 413
U.S. 433 (1973).
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Court to operate, for the sake of clarity and efficiency, by such
categorical rules, or is the Court not obliged rather to determine
and judge the constitutionally relevant interests at stake in the particular case? This question will recur in the analysis of United States
v. Robinson, which presents it in a particularly stark form.4'
The second problem in the administration of the "exigency" exception to the warrant requirement arises with respect to searches
incident to arrest, with which Robinson itself is concerned. If the
arrest creates an exigency excusing the warrant, how far does the
exigency go and why? In United States v. RabinoWit 42 the Court
permitted an exhaustive search of the defendant's office incident to
an arrest for possessing and selling stamps with a forged overprint.
41 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), suggests that the use of such categories
may be used in favor of the citizen as well as the officer, in this case to prevent
the warrantless search of a "house" even where an analysis of the exigencies would
support it. Here the Court held invalid the search of a drug dealer's house, following his arrest outside it for a sale of drugs evidently obtained from the house even
though there were present family members who might have destroyed the drugs
while a warrant was obtained. It may be that the use of the word "house" in the
Amendment supports the greater protection afforded the residence, or perhaps
there is a notion that the use of the car is properly subject to greater regulation,
owing to its danger, and hence that the privacy interest in it is less. In practical
terms, I think the Court is interested in ensuring that at least one place retains
important protections, even if public necessity supports interference with others.
There was some difference of view among the Justices as to whether on the facts
of the case a warrant could have been obtained for the search of the house prior to
the officer's initial appearance-the officer in fact had a warrant to arrest the suspect in connection with bail proceedings and some of the Justices seemed to think
they could have obtained a search warrant as well. The case may, therefore, be
limited to situations in which an opportunity to obtain a search warrant exists; or,
more likely and more properly, it may stand for the proposition that the likely destruction of evidence alone is not enough to permit entry to a house without a
warrant.
The "categorical rule" can be as dangerous a form for constitutional lawmaking
when it runs in favor of the suspect as when-as will be the case in Robinson-it
runs in favor of the officer. The prime example is Miranda, which in its most
extreme form would exclude statements if the warnings were defectively given,
even where it was shown that the suspect knew all of his rights anyway. See the
discussion of this aspect of Miranda in Wmar, THE LEGAL ImAGiNATION 611-14
(1973). Attention has been given to the problems of categorical rules in the so-called
irrebuttable presumption cases, beginning with Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See Note, 87 HAuv. L. REv. 1534 (1974).
What distinguishes the rules requiring probable cause, specificity, and a warrantand perhaps also the rule giving special protection to the "house"-from the
Miranda rules and the legislative categories in the irrebuttable presumption cases,
is the fact that these categories are established in the Constitution itself.
42 339 U.S. 56 (1950). The fluctuating history of the permissible scope of such
searches is presented in some detail in this case.
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(The overprint makes them valuable to collectors.) In his famous
dissent, Justice Frankfurter argued that the power to search without a warrant ought to go no further than the reasons for which it
exists, namely, to search for evidence the defendant might try to
grab and destroy, and for weapons he might use against the officers.
"To say that a search must be reasonable is to require some criterion
of reason," said Justice Frankfurter, and he found these criteria in
the traditional requirements that probable cause exist and that a
warrant be obtained, except to the degree that the warrant is excused for the reasons stated. In Chimel v. California," the Court
repudiated Rabinowitz and adopted Justice Frankfurter's reasoning: a warrant is not required for a search of the arrestee's person or
the area in which he might grab to obtain a weapon or destroy
evidence, but for any search beyond that area both probable cause
and a warrant are required.
Mr. Justice White, speaking also for Justice Black, would have
used a different rule in Chimel. The police should be free, incident to an arrest, to carry out a search of the whole premiseseven beyond the "grabbing area"-without a warrant, but only insofar as they have probable cause. The argument is the same as that
supporting his opinion in Chambers. It will so often be the case in
such circumstances that there is a warrant-excusing exigency that
we ought to permit such searches on a blanket basis. This is not to
permit a search "without criterion of reason" for the police are
subject to the restrictions imposed by the probable cause and specificity requirements,- which determine the direction and intensity
of the permissible search. The categorical rule argued for by Justice
White would excuse, as to the search beyond the person, only the
warrant requirement, not the substantive criteria of that clause.
What Rabinowitz or Chimel leave wholly open is the question
whether the search within the "grabbing area"-which everyone
agrees requires no warrant-is limited bya probable cause requirement, as even Mr. Justice White would limit the search beyond it.
Or is the authority to search an arrested defendant an "automatic"
or "per se" authority, not controlled even by the probable cause
standard of the Fourth Amendment?
This is the question addressed by United States v. Robinson.
43

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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UNITED STATES V. ROBINSON

"I just searched him. I didn't think about what I was looking
'44
searched him."
just
I
for.
A. THE FACTS

On 19 April 1968, Officer Jenks of the District of Columbia
'45
police department made what he called a "routine spot check" of
Robinson's automobile. He asked for and examined Robinson's registration and his license, which proved to be a temporary operator's
permit. He also examined Robinson's draft card, apparently having
4
requested it.
He noticed that the operator's permit gave a birth
date of "1938," and the draft card one of "1927." He made notes of
the cards and permitted Robinson to drive away. A later check of
license records showed that one Willie Robinson, Jr., born in 1927
had had his license revoked; and that a temporary permit had subsequently been issued to one Willie Robinson, born in 1938. The
pictures on the revoked license and the application for the temporary license were both of the man Jenks had stopped.
Four days later, while on duty, Jenks saw Robinson driving the
same car, stopped him and asked to see his license and registration.
Upon being shown the same cards as before, he placed Robinson
under arrest (a) for driving while his license was revoked and (b)
for obtaining a license by misrepresentation. These offenses carry
substantial penalties, including the possibility of imprisonment. The
arrest was what the Supreme Court called a "full custody arrest,"
by which they mean that the decision had been made to take the
defendant to the station for booking. It is significant for the pur44

Testimony of the officer who arrested and searched Robinson in this case.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 251 (1973) (Marshall, J.).
4r

It was never made clear whether the initial "routine spot checek" was a truly

random stopping of cars in a systematic way or simply the use of the policeman's

hunch. There is no discussion of its propriety in the Supreme Court. In the court
of appeals, Judge Bazelon expressed the view that such procedures presented substantial constitutional problems. 471 F.2d at 1111. Presumably the Supreme Court
is to be taken not to have addressed the issue.
46447 F.2d at 1217. The defense originally argued that he had no right to ask

for the draft card, but that issue was not faced by the appellate courts at any stage.
4r471 F.2d at 1088. It is suggested in one of the opinions that Jenks then made
a check of "criminal records" and discovered that Robinson had two prior nar-

cotics convictions.

186

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

poses of this case that under District of Columbia law the offenses
were automatically bailable, that is, the defendant had the right to
be released, after booking, if he could post bond.48
It is not clear from the record whether Jenks had been looking
for Robinson, or whether he just happened to see him. The court
of appeals proceeded on the assumption, however, that Jenks's purpose was to make an arrest for the license offenses described and not
for some other, improper, purpose, such as searching him or his
car for drugs.49 All the opinions agree that Jenks had probable cause
to make the arrest for the reasons stated.
The dispute is as to the propriety of the subsequent search. Jenks
engaged in what his departmental regulations call a "full field type
search," in which the officer examines the contents of all the pockets, removing every item, even one "that he believes is not a weapon," According to Sergeant Donaldson, a police training instructor:
"Basically it is a thorough search of the individual. We would expect that in a field search that the officer completely search the
individual and inspect areas such as behind the collar, underneath
the collar, the waistband of the trousers, the cuffs, the socks and
shoes." 50 Of the search carried out in this case, Jenks said, "I just
searched him. I didn't think about what I was looking for. I just
searched him."' 51 He found in Robinson's jacket pocket a crumpledup cigarette packet, which seemed to have some objects other than
cigarettes inside it. Jenks opened the packet and found fourteen
gelatin capsules of heroin, for the possession of which Robinson
was ultimately convicted. The question was whether the capsules
were properly admitted at trial, or whether they should have been
excluded as the fruit of a search improper under the standards of
the Fourth Amendment. 2
48 Id.at 1102-03.
49 Id. at 1088 n.3. The court of appeals did not deal with the defendant's allegations of improper motive because they found the search improper on other grounds.
The Supreme Court said: 'Wethink it is sufficient for purposes of our decision
that respondent was lawfully arrested for an offense, and that Jenks' placing him
in custody following that arrest was not a departure from established police department practice .... We leave for another day questions which would arise on facts
different from these." 414 U.S. at 221 n.1. The implications of this rather Delphic
statement are discussed in the text infra, at notes 81-82.
50 414 U.S. at 221-22 n.2.
51471 F.2d at 1089 n.9; 414 U.S. at 251.
52

One of the factual peculiarities of the case is the assertion made and not dis-

puted that for this offense Jenks was "required" by his departmental regulations (a)
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Having been arrested in April 1968, the defendant was held in
jail, unable to post bond, until his trial in August 1969, when he
was convicted. His appeal resulted first in a reversal by a panel of
the court; then, after rehearing en banc, in a remand for factual
clarification-the original record was somewhat obscure on the facts
surrounding the search-in June 1971. The trial court held a factual
hearing pursuant to the remand order, and the case was reheard
en bane in October 1972. The court of appeals held the search in-

valid since there was no claim that it had as its object evidence of
the crime for which Robinson was arrested, and since it exceeded
the sort of "frisk"-defined in Terry v. Ohio-which was adequate
to protect the officer against the use of weapons. 53 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and, after argument, affirmed the conviction in December 1973. I stress these details because one of the
important structural facts the Court must face is the staggering exto make what they call a "summary arrest" and what the Supreme Court calls a
"full custody arrest" and (b) to carry out the "full field search" referred to above.
The source of the arrest requirement is Metropolitan Police Department General
Order No. 3, Series 1959, which reads in part:
"The use of Traffic Violation Notices is a courtesy of long standing and shall
be employed whenever possible, consistent with the overall safety of the public.
Only in the more serious or aggravated types of traffic violations, those which indicate a serious disregard for the safety of others, or those in which the officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that the individuals concerned will, in all probability,
ignore the Traffic Violation Notices, should it be necessary to make summary arrest.
These include, but are not confined to: . .. OperatingAfter Suspension or Revocation of Operator'sPermit.... In these types of cases and in the interest of public
safety, it is not appropriate to permit the offending motorists to continue on to
their destinations and summary arrests should be made." 471 F.2d at 1097 n.23.
The source of the requirement that pursuant to a custodial arrest the officer make
a "full field search," as described above, seems to be the instruction of training
officers such as Sergeant Donaldson. But it is never made clear what sort of "requirements" these are: are they mandatory rules, for deviations from which officers
are punished in some way, perhaps by the imposition of sanctions, perhaps by
receiving poor performance reports? Or are they suggestions or guidelines, subject
to exception when good judgment requires it? These questions are never answered.
As the Court decides the case they are ultimately unimportant, for in a companion
case it upheld a similar search where there were no such requirements. Gustafson
v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). At least one commentator, however, has suggested
that the existence of such rules, and the degree of compliance with them, should
be of the greatest importance, for such rules tend to prevent what this commentator regards as a central concern of the Fourth Amendment, discriminatory or
arbitrary use of police power. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendnent, 58 MiNN. L. REv. 349, 416-39 (1974).
53 471 F.2d at 1099-1100.
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penditure of time, money, and energy on the defendant's side as
well as the prosecution's, and by the Court as well as by the parties,
that a case such as this entails.
B. THE COURT'S OPINION

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, spoke at first as
though this were a simple case that could be disposed of by reference to a well-established rule. "The validity of the search of a
person incident to a lawful arrest has been regarded as settled from
its first enunciation, and has remained virtually unchallenged until
the present case." 54 The question that has troubled the Court in the
past, how far beyond the person such a search may go, was not at
issue. The limitations of Terry v. Ohio do not apply where a "full
custody arrest" has occurred. He pointed to many cases, state and
federal, which establish in general terms the right to search the
person of one who is arrested, a principle that has been stated over
and over again.
Beneath the surface, however, as the Court recognized, there
are substantial complications. The numerous judicial reiterations of
the right to search (a) are cast in extremely general terms, without
express consideration of the question before the Court in this case,
i.e., whether that right is absolute or in some way conditional or
restricted; and (b) are usually accompanied by a statement of the
reasons supporting the search, i.e., the need to discover any weapons
the person arrested might use against the officer and any evidence
of the crime which he might try to destroy. Implicit in these justifications may well be principles of limitation. The first point
is important. It is usual that a legal rule is not absolute but qualified
or presumptive-virtually always admitting the possibility of an
exception or qualification upon another version of the facts-and
to convert a statement of a general principle into a statement of an
absolute rule of unconditional authority would do intellectual violence to well-established conventions of legal thought and argument.55 The second point is also important. What makes it possible
54 414 U.S. at 224.
55 The best statement of the presumptive or defeasible nature of the legal rule
is that of Professor H. L. A. Hart, in The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights,
in LoGIC AND LANGUAGE, Ist Ser. 145 (Flew ed. 1955). An interesting elaboration and
application of this view appears in Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. Cm.
L. REv. 556 (1973).
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to claim that the system of rules and the confusing pattern of adjudication built around them which together we call the law is
ultimately grounded in rationality is that the process is at its heart
a purposive and expressive one, in which the application of general
rules is to be shaped by the reasons that support them and in which
particular decisions rest not upon the rote application of general
propositions but are justified by reference to the purposes of the
rules as they apply in the particular case. In Robinson's case-unlike many others, in which the general rule would properly applyit was conceded by the Government that there was no possible
evidence of the crime which the defendant might have tried to
destroy, so that basis for the search falls away. 6 With respect to
the protection of the officer, the court of appeals found that the
factual record supported the conclusion that a Terry "frisk" was
adequate to uncover virtually any weapons the defendant might
seek to employ. The seizure of the cigarette packet, and its opening, exceeded the limits of such a frisk and were accordingly found
improper by the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court speaks to these objections in a critically important paragraph:57
[O]ur more fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion that there must be litigated in
each case the issue of whether or not there was present one
of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the
person incident to a lawful arrest. We do not think the long
line of authorities of this Court dating back to Weeks, or what
we can glean from the history of practice in this country and
in England, requires such a case-by-case adjudication. A police
officer's determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick
ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of
each step in the search. The authority to search the person
incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need
to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what
a court may later decide was the probability in a particular
GO471 F.2d at 1094 n.17.
57 414 U.S. at 235. Mr. Justice Powell put much the same point more bluntly
in his concurrence: "I believe that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial
arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his
person." Id. at 237.
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arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be
found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a
suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under
the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is
the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority
to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial
arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is
also a "reasonable" search under that Amendment.
This statement means that the Court will simply not listen to the
claim that a particular search incident to an arrest was not in fact
supported by the reasons that underlie the practice generally. To
this extent the Court would allow an interference with interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment without requiring that the
interference be justified in the usual ways. When the Court authorized the search for weapons and the seizure of the packet
without requiring any showing of a basis to suspect that the defendant might be armed, the Court dispensed with the principle-a
version of which was employed even in Terry-that a search be
based upon probabilities reasonably assessed with respect to the
facts of the particular case. This is what I have called the principle
of particular justification, normally applied in criminal searches.
When the Court validated the opening and examination of the
packet it departed from tradition even more markedly. It was unlikely that the packet could contain any evidence of the crime,
and any weapons it might contain could apparently be rendered
harmless by simply retaining the packet, unexamined, until the defendant was released. To permit the opening and examination of
the packet in these circumstances is inconsistent with the basic principle underlying all the cases in the Fourth Amendment field, including Camara, that each intrusion must be justified in some way
by reasoned reference to the legitimate interests of the state. This
is what I have called the principle of general justification. When
the Court departed from this principle and validated the search
as a matter simply of "authority," it employed a concept wholly
new to Fourth Amendment law.
This is not necessarily to say that the case is wrong. There is
great force in the Court's position that after-the-fact adjudication
of the risks and necessities presented by each situation in which a
search is carried out incident to arrest is impracticable in the highest
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degree. We have no videotape of the event. On what basis can these
factual judgments be made? And, in any event, great latitude must
be given to the officer's judgment of what his safety requires. The
process of arrest can be extremely dangerous, and the claim of the
officer that he is entitled to take whatever steps seem reasonable
to him to protect himself is understandable and urgent. Indeed,
any limiting rule is likely to have little effect in practice upon conduct genuinely thought necessary to self-protection. Moreover, the
rule of Robinson is limited to cases in which there is probable cause
to make a custodial arrest, which is normally a vastly greater imposition than any search and which will usually be followed, in
any case in which the suspect is jailed, by an inventory search of an
extremely thorough kind. In addition, the blanket authority seems
to provide a simple rule that the police and lower courts can follow, and, to this extent, to introduce a measure of order into what
is otherwise a confusing sea of adjudication. It promises, too, to
conserve social resources that are now being poured in huge quantities into the process of determining the propriety of what, upon
any practical view, are really quite minor shifts in the degree of an
intrusion. In the present case, for example, where nearly everyone
agrees that it was all right for the officer to pat the outside of the
pocket with the cigarette packet, years have been consumed in litigation of the question whether the additional intrusion involved in
the seizure and opening of the packet was permissible.
Faced with these tensions, how should argument over their resolution proceed? With an ambiguity of attitude that has become
traditional in such cases, the Court suggested history as a starting
place and claimed to find widespread, indeed practically universal,
support for its position in the statements of state and federal courts
and the views of commentators. But, typically, the Court ultimately
conceded that the question had not been authoritatively settled in a
plain holding and regarded itself as free to decide the matter either
way in light of Fourth Amendment principles and practical realities.
Examination of the historical background is difficult and highly
problematic, especially for one who is not a professional historianand there is a serious uncertainty among lawyers about what to do
with what history uncovers-yet some attempt should be made, for
the authority of the Court and of its judgment begins in large measure with the connections it can draw with its own past.
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C. THE HISTORY

The precise question before the Court, whether the scope of
searches incident to arrest shall be established in a blanket way under a general rule of authority, has never been expressly decided
by the Supreme Court. What Mr. Justice Rehnquist pointed to was
a vast number of general statements to the effect that there is a
"right to search incident to arrest," and the absence of any Supreme
Court cases specifically holding that such searches are to be limited
by their justifications. The first question is how this indeterminate
past ought to be read. The major difficulties with the material upon
which the Court relies are (a) that the statements of the "rule" permitting a search incident to arrest are so brief and general that they
cannot be said to address the question whether it should be an absolute rule or limited by its purposes; and (b) that they normally
include a statement of the justifications for the rule, seemingly implying limitations on its scope. For example, in Weeks v. United
States,58 the Court said in dictum:
What then is the present case? Before answering that inquiry
specifically, it may be well by a process of exclusion to state
what it is not. It is not an assertion of the right on the part of
the Government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally
arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.
This right has been uniformly maintained in many cases. I
Bishop on Criminal Procedure, § 211; Wharton, Crim. Plead.
and Practice, 8th ed., § 60; Dillon v. O'Brien and Davis, 16
Cox C.C. 245.

The statement that the right has been "uniformly maintained" is, I
believe, to be taken as a statement of the uniformity with which the
general rule has been accepted, not as a statement that the generally
stated right is without limit or qualification. Limits, for example,
seem both stated and implied in the following language in the work
by Bishop relied on by the Court in the quoted passage: 59
[T]he right of search for this purpose [of finding weapons to
prevent escape] does not exist of course in every case; as, for
example, where the arrest is for mere disorderly drunkenness,
and it is submitted to, and there is no ground to fear an
58 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
59 1 BisHop, CRIMINAL PROcEDURE § 210 (3d ed. 1880).

(Emphasis added.)
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attempt at escape. In like manner, in cases of larceny, and
others in which there is a probability of finding evidence of
guilt on the prisoner's person, he may be searched for them.
In addition, at least some of the judicial statements relied on by
the Court seem to be directed not to the question whether a search
is valid irrespective of the existence of justifying reasons but to a
different question. Is a search of the person of the defendant, otherwise valid, to be held invalid because no warrant has been obtained?
That there is such an exception to the warrant requirement is of
course plainly established by the cases:6 0
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to
search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and
to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find
and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the
means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and
other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be
doubted.
But to convert that statement of an exception to the warrant requirement into a rule of unqualified authority would strain the apparent purpose of the language, especially where it suggests the
reasons which support, and presumably define, the power of search.
The Agnello language just quoted suggests a line of connection
with another pair of cases of considerable historical importance,
Rabinowitz and Chimel, already discussed. For Agnello suggests
that the search of the person incident to arrest and the search of
whatever portion of his premises may be searched without a warrant are to be regarded in the same light and are to be justified in
the same way."' While neither Rabinowitz nor Chimel deals with
the proper scope of the search of the person, it seems to be assumed
on all sides in the opinions that any search beyond the person is to
be limited by probable cause. 6 2 Mr. Justice White's dissent in Chimel
makes plain that he is arguing for no stronger rule as to the zone
beyond the person, though both he and the majority do suggest,
somewhat ambiguously, that a different rule might apply to the
00 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
61 The implications of this passage seem to me inconsistent with the statement
in the Court's opinion that the search of the person and the search of the area
within his control have "been treated quite differently:' 414 U.S. at 224.
62 Justice Minton's opinion in Rabinowitz is sufficiently opaque to suggest a possible qualification of this statement.
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search of the person himself. 63 But no authority is advanced to support this view, and the other cases, such as Agnello, seem to consider the search of the person and whatever other search is permitted
in the same light. And, as the Court in Robinson recognized, a dictum in Peters v. New York6" plainly suggests some limitations on
the power to search the person:
[T~he incident search was obviously justified "by the need to
seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault
an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent
the destruction of evidence of the crime." Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). Moreover, it was reasonably
limited in scope by these purposes. Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and thoroughgoing examination of
Peters and his personal effects.
But I think one should hesitate to place too much weight on these
apparent assumptions, whichever way they cut, since in none of the
cases is there an express and distinct consideration of the Robinson
question. As Mr. Justice Rehnquist ultimately concluded, the question has not been authoritatively addressed by the Supreme Court,
and there is conflicting evidence as to the Court's assumptions on
the matter.
There is another branch of history to which the Court might
properly look in attempting to resolve what its own cases have left
open. What have in fact been the practices and understandings upon which the lower courts and police have operated, from the
making of the Constitution on? For if a plain understanding permitting such searches on an automatic and unreviewable basis could
be established, that would tend to support-though not conclusively-the majority's reading of the earlier Supreme Court statements.
Here I can only refer to the findings of others. There is very little
evidence to go on. In an essay attacking the views of Justice Frankfurter expressed in Rabinowitz, and later adopted by the Court in
Chimel, Professor Telford Taylor has claimed that the Fourth
Amendment was directed at the abuses of the warrant practice, that
"none of the parties was at all concerned about warrantless searches
63 395 U.S. at 763, 773, 780-81.
64 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968). Justice Harlan in his concurrence agreed with this
statement only as a "factual observation," evidently refusing to accept it as a doctrine of limitation. 392 U.S. at 77.
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incident to arrest," and, as a historical matter, that "[t]here is little
reason to doubt the search of an arrestee's person and premises is as
old as the institution of arrest itself." 65 But if there is little reason
to doubt, there is little reason to assert. We simply do not know
much about eighteenth-century practice. In the nineteenth century we are little better off. The numerous state court opinions
cited by the Supreme Court are cast in much the same general way
as the Supreme Court opinions and are similarly accompanied by
reasons which may be meant to suggest limitations. For example,
the Court quotes an extensive passage from the early New Hampshire case of Closson v. Morrison which concluded: 66
We think the officer arresting a man for crime, not only may,
but frequently should, make such searches and seizures; that
in many cases they might be reasonable and proper, and courts
would hold him harmless for so doing, when he acts in good
faith, and from a regard to his own or the public safety, or the
security of his prisoner.
And there is at least some evidence that the practice of searches was
not wholly uniform. In Illinois, for example, it was said that "An
officer has no right to search a prisoner unless he has a warrant au' 7
thorizing him to make the search."
There is another difficulty, not mentioned in Robinson, in making sense of what evidence there is. Many of the statements of the
right to search the arrestee seem to assume that he is to be placed
in jail, which provides a whole new set of justifications for a search:
to prevent the introduction of weapons and contraband to the jail,
and to protect the police (by making an inventory of the defendant's possessions) against charges of theft, neglect, and the like.
These factors are not present in the Robinson case-although they
would be in a large number of arrest cases-because under District
of Columbia law Robinson had a right to be released on payment
05 TAmoR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 39, 28 (1969).
06 47 N.H. 482, 485 (1867). The next sentence in the New Hampshire opinion
makes the qualification express: "It must, we think, in a case like this, be a question
of fact for the jury, whether the taking of the property from the prisoner were
bona fide, for any purpose indicated above as reasonable and proper, and, of course,
justifiable, or whether it were mala fide, unreasonable, and for an improper and
unjustifiable purpose."
67 MOORE,A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 148 (1876).
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of a bond, without being incarcerated." Finally, as Mr. Justice
Marshall made clear in his dissent, the majority relied on its view
of past understandings without adequately dealing with the large
number of contemporary cases which have held full searches impermissible incident to an arrest for a traffic violation, unless there
were special circumstances supporting such intrusions.6 9
The conclusion I come to about the history is different only in
emphasis from that reached by the Court. It seems plain that the
Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the question presented by Robinson and there seems to have been no widespread
and explicit understanding on the point. What we do have is, on the
one hand, nearly unanimous general statements of the right to
search incident to arrest and the absence of any Supreme Court
holdings expressly limiting that right; on the other, statements of
justification seeming to imply limitation, and a general understanding, running very deeply through the Fourth Amendment cases,
that intrusions must be justified in some rational way by reference
to those interests of the state they are meant to serve. How the tension between the requirement of justification and the general statements of authority to search should be resolved is a question the
Court in Robinson properly regarded as left open by the earlier
cases.
D. THE MERITS

I begin with a reminder of three important factual peculiarities
of this case. (1) It is assumed that there existed no evidence of crime
68 Although the police plainly have a legitimate interest both in preventing the
introduction of contraband and weapons into the jail and in protecting themselves
against claims as custodians of items held, the right to search the defendant and
his possessions should be limited to steps necessary to secure these ends. It may be,
as Judge Leventhal has put it, "that a less extreme intrusion on privacy [marks]
the limits of reasonableness, as by giving him an opportunity, like that accorded
someone given a bathhouse locker for temporary use, to 'check' his belongings
in a sealed envelope, perhaps upon executing a waiver releasing the office of any
responsibility." United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231, 1239 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
United States v. Edwards, 94 S. Ct. 1234 (1974), may by implication have decided
the question the other way. But that case does involve a search (for paint chips
on an imprisoned defendant's clothes) for which there was probable cause, and
can thus be distinguished from cases in which a search is engaged in solely for inventory purposes.
69 See cases cited 414 U.S. at 244-47, and 471 F.2d at 1103-05.
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for which Jenks could have been searching.10 (2) The arrest was a
"full custody" arrest, after which the defendant was to be taken to
the station and booked; but (3) incarceration could legally follow
only if the defendant did not make bail. In these circumstances and
in the light of the Fourth Amendment tradition described above,
are the frisk, the seizure of the cigarette packet, and the opening of
the packet to be regarded as permissible?
1. Terry v. Ohio: variations on a theme. One possibility is to regard the case as governed by Terry v. Ohio. If an officer can point
to particular facts leading him to believe that the arrestee may be
armed, he may carry on a "frisk" of the sort described in Terry to
discover any weapons the arrestee might use. Where, as in Robinson, there is no claim that the search can be justified as a search for
evidence, no search beyond such a frisk should be permitted incident to arrest. This analysis would limit the intrusion by the justifications that support it as determined with respect to the facts of
the particular case.
70

What ought to be the scope when there is evidence for which the officer could
have been looking? For such searches fall not within the "civil search" category I
have suggested above, and, insofar as they are based upon probable cause, their
fruits may be used against the defendant. What is unclear is what "probable cause"
will mean in the search for evidence, a difficulty only obliquely adverted to in
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), which for the first time held that "mere
evidence" may be seized. The difficulty is this. In searches for contraband and
fruits of crime, the only question is the probability that the searched-for items
will be at the place where the search is to take place. With a search for evidence,
there should be a new question as well, which is whether the evidence as to the
existence of which there is the requisite probable cause is sufficiently probative to
support the search. That is, in the first case the defendant has no right to the
items in question and there is a plain right in the state to have them, if they can
properly be found and seized. Evidence, however, may range from the critical
piece of evidence likely to prove guilt-the bloody shirt, the fingerprint-to items
of the most marginal importance to the trial of the case: cumulative evidence
to show that the defendant was in Miami on the critical date, for example, or
that he is in the stamp-collecting business, points which the defense might happily
concede. At one stage of the present case, for example, it was urged that the search
could have been validated on evidentiary grounds on the theory that the defendant
might have been carrying the notice of permit revocation normally sent out by
the motor vehicle department. 471 F.2d at 1094 n.17. This, it was argued, would
be probative to demonstrate willfulness. What sort of interest in the evidence,
beyond its marginal admissibility, need the government demonstrate in order to
justify a search? If the argument made by the government were to suffice, the claim
made in Warden v. Hayden that searches for evidence are "no more intrusive"
than searches for contraband or stolen goods is a hollow one indeed. The require-
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As the Court points out, however, there are substantial differences between the facts of Terry and the facts of custodial arrest
cases that might make one hesitate to apply the Terry rule simpliciter. As a matter of psychology, the person subjected to arrest
is probably more likely to use a weapon, if he has one, than is one
who is simply being talked to by the police, as in Terry. He presumably has more to lose from what the police seek to do to him
and more determined resistance on his part is, as a general matter,
more likely. The physical circumstances of a custodial arrest are
also significantly different from those of a stop and frisk, especially
when the officer is alone and must take the arrestee to the station in
his car. Because the officer's attention must be given to other matters, it will be easier for the arrestee to employ a weapon, if he has
one, without interference by the officer, and it is less likely that an
attempt to reach a weapon will give rise to "articulable suspicion"
permitting a Terry frisk. For similar reasons, smaller and more
carefully hidden weapons-razor blades, small knives, and the likemay present a greater danger in the arrest than the stop and frisk
situation. Handcuffing may limit the danger, but a court naturally
hesitates to turn such probabilities into rules of constitutional law.
And, as the Court recognized in Terry itself, when we deal with
the steps taken by an officer to protect himself because he genuinely
feels endangered, we have to face the fact that rules may have very
little effect on his conduct. Finally, there are special considerations
favoring a highly restricted rule in Terry that do not apply here.
In Terry there is by hypothesis no probable cause to arrest, and
the only criterion by which the right to frisk is regulated is the vague
"articulable suspicion." 71 The Terry' frisk rule, therefore, creates
the danger of widespread and practically unreviewable frisks of the
citizenry generally, at the whim or hunch of the policeman. In
Robinson, by contrast, we assume a valid arrest based upon probable
cause, and any automatic authorization will accordingly be narrowly limited in its impact.
ment in the new Federal Rules is that the items constitute "evidence" of crime,
but it is most unclear how that term will be construed. FED. R. CRIA. P. 41.
71 "[Tihe police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion." 392 U.S. at 21. "[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that
of others was in danger." Id. at 27.
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In response to such considerations as these, two variations on the
Terry rule were suggested. Mr. Justice Marshall took the view that
if there were some reason to believe the arrestee was armed, a search
for arms could be much more thorough than the Terry frisk. But
no search, or no search beyond a most minimal frisk, could properly go on unless there were some proper basis for particular suspicion at its initiation. Because he would have disposed of the case
on other grounds-that even if the frisk was good, the opening of
the packet was an intrusion not justifiable by the demands of the
situation-Mr. Justice Marshall did not indicate what degree of suspicion should be required or how it should be measured. 72 The
trouble with requiring a particular suspicion based upon articulable
facts is that it requires the Court to make post hoc judments about
the degree of risk, or probability of weapons, of a sort it cannot
confidently or competently make. And the officer may legitimately
feel that it does not speak fairly to the hazards and uncertainties
of his task. He has no clear guides. His judgment must be made
fast and on the basis of incomplete information. The requirement,
if followed, puts him at risk of his life whenever he cannot justify
his sense of danger by pointing to reportable facts. Yet he knows
and we know that his sense of danger may be both real and accurate. We have all seen people so hard or mean in appearance that
they make us feel uncomfortable, perhaps to the point of crossing
the street or moving our seat on the subway. We have confidence
in such judgments, and act on them ourselves, yet how could we
explain
them in a court of law? How can we ask an officer to do
73
SO?

Apparently moved by such doubts, the court of appeals adopted
72

There are indications in the Marshall opinion that some unjustified frisk
may be appropriate, but I think he would prefer to require some particularized
suspicion for any intrusion.
73
These are difficulties with the limitations of the Terry rule, too, of course. But,
as suggested above, in a case where there is no probable cause to arrest, the Court
may properly feel that restrictions on the frisk are more important, lest the entire
population be subject to the uncontrolled possibility of police frisk. Robinson, by
contrast, assumes a contemporaneous valid arrest, and the class of persons exposed
to any automatic search rule is correspondingly small. There is another facet to
the distinction. In a large class of cases, at least, the state interest in the intrusion,
and correspondingly the professional obligation of the policeman to proceed, is
greater where there is probable cause to arrest than in a Terry investigation. More,
that is, will be lost if the officer fails to act through uncertainty as to his safety or
his right to protect himself.
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a somewhat different version of the Terry rule, and held that whenever a custodial arrest is made a Terry frisk may be carried out,
whether or not there are particular facts giving rise to articulable
suspicion that the arrestee is armed. But given the differences suggested above between the Terry situation and the custodial arrest
what assurance has the Court that the frisk will be adequate to its
purposes?
In holding the Terry frisk an adequate device to uncover weapons, the court of appeals relied heavily upon the fact that Sergeant
Donaldson admitted on cross-examination that a "properly conducted Terry-type frisk could uncover virtually every weapon he had
ever encountered in the course of in-custody searches." 74 And the
Government arms expert, who appeared on the stand with twentyfive deadly weapons secreted on his person, admitted that "virtually all of these weapons could be detected in the course of a properly conducted frisk. ' 75 But as the court's footnote makes plain,
there was some confusion as to what he meant by the term "frisk,"
and to rest a constitutional holding upon such a factual basis makes
one uneasy. Suppose in the next case more knowledge or skill on
the part of the expert or the prosecuting attorney leads to testimony
that contradicts these admissions? And it is admitted by the court
of appeals that some weapons could not be discovered by a frisk.70
In a world of violence, why should the officer not be able to take
whatever steps are necessary to satisfy himself that he is not in
danger from a person he has arrested?
74 471 F.2d at 1100. The court of appeals and the Supreme Court seem to accept
the following definition of a frisk, quoted in Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 n.13: "[T]he
officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A
thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and
back, the groin and the area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down
to the feet." The Court was quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarning
Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954).
75 471 F.2d at 1100.

76 Ibid. It is worth noting that one of the weapons the expert produced, a .22
pistol made of a small aluminum tube, was hidden in a cigarette package. Id. at
1117-18 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). But Mr. Justice Marshall cites the FBI Uniform
Crime Reports for the fact that of the 112 policemen killed on duty in 1972, 108
were killed by firearms, two by knives, and one each by a bomb and an automobile.
Can one infer from such statistics that a frisk is perfectly adequate? We do not

know from this report anything about woundings or attempts to wound; and it
is not inconceivable that a limitation announced by the Supreme Court should in-

fluence the sort of weapons that are carried. For further discussion of these questions, see 471 F.2d at 1100.
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The account I have given of the views of Mr. Justice Marshall
and the court of appeals shows the rule of Robinson to enjoy at
least partial support from those who oppose it. In holding that the
right to search is automatic, the Supreme Court has the agreement
of the court of appeals. In holding that the permitted search may be
more extensive than a frisk, the agreement of Mr. Justice Marshall.
The Court should not be regarded, then, as taking some politically
motivated turn to the right, but as responding to considerations
whose legitimacy is widely conceded. This is another way of saying that this is a genuinely hard case.
2. The Robinson rule of automatic authority to search. As Mr.
Justice Marshall suggested, there are two distinct questions presented by Robinson: Is a full search of an arrestee's person for
weapons automatically permissible, notwithstanding the apparent
inconsistency of such a rule with the principle of particular justification? If such a search is automatically permissible-under what I
have called the principle of general justification-is the Court right
in validating the additional intrusion entailed in the opening and
examination of the packet, and if so on what grounds? It may be
that every interest of the officer could have been protected if he
had simply retained the packet, without opening it, and returned it
to Robinson when he was released. Since the Court made no inquiry
into this factual question, it seems to permit this intrusion without
requiring that it be justified in any fashion, even by reference to
the needs of the situation stated in the most general way.
a) Opening the packet: a rule of lawlessness? Assuming for the
moment that the automatic search is permissible as a reasonable response to the dangers typically present in arrest situations, can the
opening of the packet be justified? By hypothesis there was no evidence to discover. And the officer could presumably have protected
himself against the use of any weapon it might have contained by
simply retaining it until the suspect was released. It is on these
grounds that Mr. Justice Marshall dissents, and his concern seems
well founded. An emergency situation, and the legitimate claims
of the officer to protect himself, may justify a shift from the requirement of particular justification to a rule based upon general or
categorical probabilities and necessities. But to permit the opening
of the packet seems to abandon the very idea that the intrusion need
be justified at all, that the government has an obligation to explain
its intrusive behavior by reference to its legitimate interests and
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concerns. This would disregard not only the standards of both
halves of the Fourth Amendment but perhaps the most fundamental
notion of legality, that the government is bound to justify its intrusions by rational reference to its legitimate concerns."
Imagine a situation in which an arrested person is being searched.
He asks the officer, "Why are you searching me? Why are you
taking away from me the things that I am carrying?" The officer
may answer, "Because I am taking you to the station and I want to
be sure that there is no weapon you may use against me." That
response may or may not be sufficient under the standards of the
Fourth Amendment but it is an exercise in reasoned justification.
Contrast: "Why are you opening that packet-or wallet, or envelope-and examining what is in it?" The officer responds, in a
paraphrase of Officer Jenks's words: "I'm just searching. I don't
think about what I'm searching for. I'm just searching."
A rule permitting a search on the latter basis says, for the first
time, that the citizen whose rights are invaded is not entitled to
insist that the invasion be limited by either a particular or a general
justification. Instead of being regarded as a person, whose interests
clash with those of the police, the suspect is here told that in some
important way he belongs to the police and not to himself. Earlier
I suggested that the task of the Court under the Fourth Amendment could be said to find a way to talk about an irreconcilable
clash of interests that did justice to the claims on both sides, to find
a language in which the opposing sides could both talk, expressing
their claims and defining their disagreement. The idea is not that
either or both sides would be compelled to accept as right a decision reached, but that both should recognize that they have an opportunity to put their cases as rational people and have them heard.
In Robinson, the Court talked about the officer and citizen in radi77
In this sense, among others, the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment can be seen as intimately related, even if the particular criteria of the former were not thought to be "incorporated" in the latter.
The interference by a police officer with a citizen's security and freedom-a search
and seizure-is a deprivation of liberty or property to which the Due Process Clause
should apply by its express terms. Even on the state of the law antedating Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), a state would
presumably not have been permitted to authorize searches and seizures without
rational reference to its legitimate concerns. To the extent that Robinson establishes such an authority, it can be said to be inconsistent not only with the Fourth
Amendment but with the most fundamental conceptions of the Due Process Clause
and the principle that the police are rationally answerable to the law.
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cally different ways, not as opposing litigants with equal standing,
but of one as an agent who simply has power to use as he wills, and
of the other as one who is simply subject to it. If a citizen asked how
this part of Robinson defined his place in a public world he would
find that he is given no right to insist that the officer explain or
justify what he does; his role is simply to submit. What is more,
since the power to which he is subject need not be justified or explained, there is no rational way to determine its scope. If the officer
may look in the packet, may he open an envelope and read a letter?
May he open a briefcase and read the files? Why not search the
entire car, the home, the office? If the grant of authority is not
based upon reasons, it cannot be limited by them either. The impact
is one not of clarification but incoherence, for clarity is a function
of intelligibility. And the effects run deep. However Robinson may
be limited by future cases, it stands as a permanent rhetorical resource, a case that can be called upon in the widest range of cases
by anyone who wishes to argue that the police should have one
blanket power or another as a matter simply of "authority." If I
read Robinson accurately in this way, it introduces into our constitutional law a principle of moral and intellectual brutality-a rule
of authority rather than rationality-that is inconsistent with every
aspect of our legal tradition.
Can the case be read any other way? As I understand the opinion
of Mr. Justice Rehnquist it cannot. Indeed, it seems to be a primary
purpose of this opinion to establish a radically new way of talking about the relationship between the suspect and the officer described above-and to that extent the case should be repudiated. But
it may be that even this aspect of the holding of the case can be
explained and supported in another way, with a far less disastrous
impact on our tradition than seems to be implied in the majority
opinion. In the first place, it is physically possible for the packet
to have contained a weapon which might have been used against
the officer. This distinguishes this search from the examination of
documents, the reading of letters, or any intrusions beyond the area
in which the suspect could reach, and may impose some limit on
the rule of authority the case establishes. Second, the alarmist view
of this case I have expressed above depends upon an assumption of
fact: that the officer could have as easily protected himself by retaining the packet as by examining it. It may be that this was not
true, or not felt to be true by the officer. We do not know whether
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his uniform had an empty pocket that could easily be reached, for
example. Third, it could be maintained that the intrusion actually
occurring here was no greater than that we have assumed would
be permissible, namely, retaining the packet until the release of the
suspect. That is, the very retention of the item without examination
is itself a substantial Fourth Amendment intrusion and perhaps there
should be no constitutional significance in the difference between
retention and examination.78 For example, if it were one's wallet
that were in question, and if it contained no contraband or weapon,
one might well prefer that it be searched and returned, instead of
retained. It may be thought that the suspect should be able to choose
which alternative is "more" intrusive, but it is perhaps not realistic
to require, in every case and without regard to the peculiarities of
the facts, that an arresting officer give such options to the people
he is taking into custody. In sum, I think it would conflict with the
attitude expressed by the Court, but not unduly strain its holding,
to say that Robinson should authorize no search (a) that could not
be said to be directed at weapons or evidence of the crime for which
the arrest takes place; and (b) that was found to be more intrusive
than an alternative in every respect equally protective and so perceived by the officer. A difficulty would remain. Suppose the search
is within the permissible ambit, what response should be made to
a defendant's offer to prove that the intrusion was in fact not motivated by an honest fear of weapons or belief in the existence of
evidence? I propose below that a "good faith" limit should be
adopted as the basis for relief in a civil action. But even without
that limit, the narrowing construction proposed above would make
this part of Robinson more nearly consistent with the principle of
general justification, and many of its most troublesome or dangerous
implications would be sharply curtailed. The proper result would
then have been either a remand for determination of the factual
question suggested, or a holding for the government on the grounds
that the defendant had failed to carry his burden on the point.

b) Can the automatic right to search be justified? Should the
78 There is some support for such reasoning. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970), upheld the warrantless search of a car that had been taken to the police
station after an arrest, on the cumulative grounds that under Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the warrantless search of the car on the highway, at the

time of arrest, would have been valid and that the Court could not say that it was
a greater intrusion to take the car to the station and search it there.
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search incident to arrest be regulated under the traditional standards
governing searches that are part of the criminal process-requiring
a specific showing of probability on the basis of the particular
facts-or should it properly be regulated under what I have called
the principle of general justification, requiring only a showing of a
legitimate governmental interest and a sufficient categorical or statistical probability to support the intrusion? The pressures are plain.
On the one hand, the claim by the officer that he be free to do
what he thinks necessary for his self-protection is an urgent and
comprehensible one, and post hoc review of the particular risks and
probabilities seems unworkable and even unfair. On the other hand,
a truly automatic rule of authority to search would have enormous
practical and theoretical consequences. A thorough search could
be made of any person subjected to custodial arrest, including a
wide range of traffic offenders, without any showing of any rationally based suspicion. An automatic rule would expose to an arbitrary and unreviewable exercise of police power every person who
violates a substantial traffic rule, which is in practice virtually
everyone. To the extent that not all of us are in fact arrested and
searched when we make a left turn without signaling or when we
go through a stoplight, the evil of the rule will shift from the
breadth and multiplicity of the incursions on Fourth Amendment
interests it authorizes to their discriminatory character. What is
more, under Robinson's rule of nonreviewability it seems plain
that searches may be carried out when there is in fact no sense of
danger, no felt concern that the suspect may be armed, and to permit such searches seems to entail all the evils apparently implicit in
the authority to open the packet. It defines the arrested person as
an object of unregulated power, not entitled to insist that the asserted justification for a search be actually present in the particular
facts or motives proceeded upon. This aspect of Robinson does
more than legitimate demands of the police for security and their
claims of expertise; it removes their conduct from regulation by
law. Or so it seems. The case may not, however, go as far as it
seems to go.
(1) What limits does Robinson suggest upon the authority it establishes? Suppose that you are seen by an officer going through
a stop sign without coming to a complete stop. Does Robinson
mean that a policeman may stop you; search you and your pockets
for weapons; examine the contents of your wallet; rifle through
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your briefcase; force you to remove your clothes; and probe your
body cavities-all without making any particular claim of suspicion
or probability? Presumably not all of those, but why not? Where
and how is the line to be drawn? To ask that question is to invite
examination of the opinion itself to see what criteria of limitation
its reasoning may suggest.
(a) The most obvious limitation apparently suggested by Robinson itself is implied in the fact that here both the arrest and the
search engaged in are said to be "required" by police regulations.
It may accordingly be thought that Robinson promises a Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence rather different from any so far suggested. At least where the police have sought to regulate themselves,
the Court will not analyze the interests at stake in a particular case
but will examine the pertinent regulation under a standard of reasonableness in light of the interests generally involved in the situation to which the regulation speaks. This system-while totally
different from what we have had-would have some real merits. It
would bring to bear what expertise the police can demonstrate in
the form of a capacity to make and justify reasonable rules. And,
assuming there is a mechanism for ensuring that what the rules "require" is in some sense really required of the police, it might substantially reduce the degree of discrimination in the exercise of
police power, which, although surely not the major target of the
Fourth Amendment, is a real evil that a sound Fourth Amendment
law should curtail. Indeed one commentator has come out strongly
for some such view of the Fourth Amendment. 79 But no such limitations, and no such theory of Fourth Amendment adjudication,
can be grounded on Robinson, for in a companion case, Gustafson
80 the Court upheld a similar
v. Florida,
arrest and search where
there was no regulation requiring that the arrest or search be made.
(b) Perhaps a more promising line is that suggested in some of
the lower court opinions and at least referred to-though with what
degree of approval it is hard to know-in the majority opinion.
Arrests and searches under Robinson may possibly be held invalid
if it can be shown that they are "pretextual" or "sham," that is, if
the real motive of the officer in making the arrest and search was
to find evidence of other crimes or to harass the suspect."' There
79

Amsterdam, note 52 supra, at 409-39.

80 414 U.S. 260 (1973).

81 What the Court said, in disposing of the question in the present case is this:

'Ve think it is sufficient for purposes of our decision that respondent was lawfully
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are, however, several difficulties with any attempt to make this approach meaningful. First, the cases establishing the invalidity of
pretextual searches are all lower court cases. The principle has never
received solid Supreme Court articulation, and it is not clear, to me
at least, that a majority of the Court would support it. I can imagine some Justices holding that if the police have the authority
to make a particular intrusion, the arrest and search should not be
invalidated simply because they made it for one reason rather than
another. A more substantial difficulty is that it is most unclear what
it means and how it would be administered, especially after the
kind of lawmaking engaged in in Robinson itself. The citizen, after
all, will almost never have direct and independent evidence of what
the officer's motive was, and the officer will in almost all cases be
able to claim that at worst his motives were mixed. To the extent
that improper motive can be shown circumstantially, by evidence
that there were no facts giving rise to articulable suspicion that
the person was armed, or that other people similarly situated had
not been similarly searched, the Court would be operating on premises inconsistent with those of Robinson and Gustafson themselves.
For if no reason need support the searches of the person and
of his belongings, it is tautological that they cannot be invalidated
on the grounds that no reasons for them can be shown. A fullfledged "pretext" rule would require a showing of regularity or
particular justification of exactly the kind Robinson says is no part
of the constitutional inquiry. I think the pretext limitation will
shrink to cover, if anything, only the case in which there is direct
evidence of motive, as where a fellow officer reports that the searching officer told him that he was "going to get that guy the first
82
chance I could."
(c) A limitation may be implicit in the Court's repeated reference to the fact that this was what the Court called a "full custody
arrested for an offense, and that Jenks' placing him in custody following that arrest
was not a departure from established police department practice.... We leave for
another day questions which would arise on facts different from these." 414 U.S.
at 221 n.l.
82 Perhaps pretext could be made out in one other class of cases on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, i.e., where it could be shown that the officer habitually
treated one race or sex differently from another. But that would be extremely
difficult to prove and would not provide a serious limit on the power to search.
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arrest," that is, an arrest to be followed by booking. Is a search of
the Robinson kind to be possible only in a booking situation? The
trouble is that even if such a requirement is established it is easily
evaded. An officer can stop, arrest, and search on the claim that
this is to be a full custody arrest. Then, if he finds nothing of an
independently incriminating nature, he may presumably "change
his mind" without objection from the arrestee, and let him go.
(d) A more promising suggestion is made by Mr. Justice Stewart in his concurrence in Gustafson, where he says that there may
be some offenses for which a full custody arrest, whether or not
authorized by state law, is not constitutionally permissible.83 (The
standards for such a rule might be similar to those of the District
of Columbia Code: a full custody arrest is appropriate only where
the defendant has demonstrated a serious disregard for the safety
of others or where there is good reason to believe that he would
not respond to a summons.) 4 This is an important and, so far as
I am aware, a novel suggestion, which ought to receive serious consideration entirely apart from Robinson. For it should apply as
well-and with even greater force, because the intrusion involved
is so much greater-to the decision made at the next stage of the
process, whether to hold the person arrested in jail, or permit him
to go free on bail or on his own recognizance. This is a difficult
field in which to make standards, and the Supreme Court has quite
understandably left it virtually alone. Its importance is plain in
Robinson's own case: the sixteen months in jail awaiting trial is
by any measure a more serious imposition than the search he underwent. If this view were adopted, one result of Robinson might
be some reduction in the litigation of cases raising the proper scope
of a search incident to arrest but an increase in cases litigating the
propriety of the arrest and detention decisions. Judicial attention
to these questions is long overdue, but I think that they are properly considered independent of the rule of Robinson itself.8 5
(e) The Court does suggest a limit when it says that the search
83 414 U.S. at 266-67.

84 471 F.2d at 1097 n.23.
85 There is one other possible implication of the "full custodial arrest" language:

it may provide the groundwork for a new way of addressing probable cause to
arrest itself. It would be possible to have a scheme in which "probable cause"
is required for a "full custodial arrest"-at which a Robinson search could go onand permit detentions less than arrest on less than probable cause, where presumably only less severe intrusions would be appropriate-Terry frisks, Davis examinations, and perhaps interrogations, subject to whatever is left of the Miranda rule.
This would permit both searches and "arrests"-at least in the tort sense-on less
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in Robinson, "partook of none of the extreme or patendy abusive
characteristics which were held to violate the due process clause of
86 This would
the Fourteenth Amendment in Rochin v. California."
presumably invalidate a skin search or cavity probe incident to a
traffic arrest, but beyond that how is the "extremity" or "abusiveness" of the search to be measured? If by reference to the legitimate concerns of the officer carrying on the search, the Court will
be operating on premises inconsistent with those that establish the
authority to search.
There would seem then to be no workable limits suggested in the
opinion upon the blanket authority of the officer to search in any
way he wishes the person and effects of anyone he subjects to a
custodial arrest for any crime. Is there any way in which the claim
of the officer to be able to take reasonable steps to protect himself
and the rights of the individual against arbitrary or unjustified
searches can be more fully and fairly reconciled?

(2) A proposal: the protective search as a civil search, subject to
the principle of general justification and to suspension of the plain
view rule. Here is my suggestion. The officer should have an automatic authority to make a full arms search incident to an arrest,
even though this authority is inconsistent with the principle of particular justification, but nothing found in such a search should be
admissible in a criminal trial of the person arrested. The premise is
that the officer's safety requires this much. Post hoc regulation by
assessing specific probabilities is simply not workable, partly because there will often be unresolvable conflicts in testimony, partly
because some very important facts-the attitude or appearance of
the defendant-simply cannot be tested later. Moreover, deterrent
rules are not likely to work where there is genuine fear. If there is
one place a hunch ought to be able to function it is in a search for
arms incident to arrest. As a matter of Fourth Amendment theory,
such an authority could be justified on the grounds that the search
in question is a civil, not a criminal, search, and should properly be
regulated by what has been called the principle of general, not particular, justification. That is, the protective search for weapons can
than probable cause and without a warrant, or with a warrant issued on less than
probable cause. The application of ink eradicator to the terms and implications of
the warrant clause-the primary constitutional definition of reasonableness-would
then be complete.
86Need it be observed that the reference to the Fourteenth Amendment here
is part of the general practice of a majority of the Court to refuse to speak approvingly of Mapp v. Ohio?
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be regarded not as part of the criminal process-like a search for
evidence-but as the sort of imposition, occasioned by plain public
necessity, that is involved in housing code inspections, inoculation
requirements, mandatory health examinations, entries to put out a
fire, searches of air travelers, and the like, to be regulated under
the "reasonable search" standard of the first clause of the Fourth
Amendment, rather than by the criteria of the warrant clause.
The difficulty is that this rule, like the Robinson rule, exposes
every arrestee to the unregulated and arbitrary power of the officer
to search him, for any reason or no reason, whether or not he is in
fact in fear of danger and searching for weapons. I have suggested
that regulation through post hoc adjudication of the reasonableness
of the fear or suspicion on the particular facts, implemented by a
deterrent exclusionary rule, is not likely to be effective. Is there
then any other way in which to regulate such searches, to attempt
to ensure that the power to search for weapons be employed only
for the reasons for which it is established? This is the aim of the
second half of my proposal: nothing found during a search for
weapons could be introduced in a criminal proceeding against the
arrested person. This would involve a suspension of what is sometimes called the "plain view" rule, permitting the seizure of any
seizable object found during a legitimate search, and this has its
costs. But it would provide a way, however imperfect, to regulate
the otherwise uncontrolled power established by Robinson. To
regulate civil searches under the reasonableness standard of the first
clause, subject to suspension of the plain view rule, would seem to
provide a sensible and practical way to validate both civil searches
and criminal searches without permitting the civil power to be used
for criminal purposes, against the language and purpose of the
Amendment. This analysis would give real force to both clauses,
yet distinguish between them; and I believe it would make a rational
and fair accommodation of the genuinely competing interests present in the arrest situation. But is there any authority for such a
proposal?
While the Supreme Court has never suggested the use of such a
limiting principle, several commentators have argued that the power
established in Terry v. Ohio should be so regulated, and it is commonly thought that Peters v. New York'87 a companion case to
87 392 U.S. 40 (1968). In this case a burglary suspect was forcibly stopped in
a hallway, and subjected to a pat-down. The officer retrieved from his pocket
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Terry, was decided as it was in order to avoid addressing the question."" In Camaraand its companion cases the question neither arose
nor was adverted to. Judge Aldrich has recently suggested that
9
such a principle be applied in searches of air travelers,8 and Professor Amsterdam has recently added his voice to those who support it with respect to Terry frisks." One certainly cannot claim
that there is solid Supreme Court authority for such a principle,
but at the very least it seems true that the Court is free to adopt it
without substantial interference with the Fourth Amendment tradition. Indeed, as I have tried to argue, this principle might be the
best way to give real force to the most important strains in that
tradition. And this does seem a rather obvious way to reconcile the
urgent and legitimate demands of the officer that he be able to take
what steps he thinks necessary to protect himself from harm, with
the very real fear that this power will be abused.
Objections are possible along several lines. First, it may be
thought insufficiently protective. The officer still has the power to
carry out whatever search he wishes; the fact that what the search
turns up will be of no value except to the officer's safety may not
in fact remove all incentives to carry on more extensive searches.
He may search out of curiosity, or a desire to harass, or to find some
item-contraband or stolen goods which he could, under existing
law, retain for destruction or return to the proper owner even if
the search were illegal. It is of course true that the removal of
criminal evidence incentives will not perfectly regulate and cona package of burglary tools which were admitted against him. Although on the particular facts it greatly stretched prior law to do so, the Court held that there was
probable cause for an arrest, and that the search engaged in was therefore permissible. This enabled the Peters Court to avoid at least two questions. Should a
forcible detention on less than probable cause be permissible, a question expressly
left open in the Terry majority opinion? 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. Should the "plain
view" rule apply in Terry frisks?
88 Authorities are collected in LaFave, 'Street Encounters' and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters,and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 39, 91-93 (1968). One distinguished author supporting this view is Justice Walter Schaefer of the Supreme
Court of Illinois. SCHAEFER, THE SuspEcr AND Soci-ry 43 (1967). The American
Law Institute considered and rejected this view in A.L.I., A MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 121-22 (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1972).
80 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1280-81 (5th Cir. 1973) (Aldrich, J.,
concurring).
00 Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 427.
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trol the search, but I think it is plain that it will help do so. And
the objection stated above goes far beyond my particular suggestion. It exposes the insufficiency of exclusion as a technique of regulation in any case. But to point to a partial insufficiency of a device
of regulation is not to say that the device is bad as far as it goes. The
question is rather how one proposal compares with others, or with
no regulation at all.
This brings me to a second line of objection. To prohibit the
use of evidence seen and seized during what is by hypothesis a
perfectly legal and valid search imposes a large social cost-the exclusion of evidence for a most conjectural gain, the deterrence of
improperly motivated searches. What is more, it seems to make
the primary thrust of the Fourth Amendment the exclusion of evidence, while in fact the major purpose is not that but to limit the
number and degree of intrusions, and the exclusionary rule is just
one remedial device to secure that goal. I would respond in the
following way:
(a) To call the search valid and legal by hypothesis is to state
conclusions in the form of premises. It is our question'-an answer
to which should not be assumed-whether such searches are to be
valid notwithstanding noncompliance with the criteria of the warrant clause, and if so under what conditions? The presumption
should be against the validity of any search that does not comport
with the criteria of the warrant clause, which states the basic Fourth
Amendment standards. When a claim is made that an overriding
social concern should validate searches even though they do not
meet those standards, the appropriate attitude, it would seem to
me, is to limit the constitutionally dubious intrusion in every sensible way.
(b) The nonapplication of the plain view rule would be such a
limitation. First, it would have some tendency, however imperfect,
to eliminate searches carried out for reasons other than proper ones
by making such searches fruitless, while a direct prohibition of
searches based on improper motives would be hard to enforce because of factual uncertainties. More important, it seems to me
wrong to regard the exclusionary rule as merely one remedy among
other remedies devised to enforce the Fourth Amendment, and
wrong to talk as if the only important question were whether an
"intrusion" was permitted, not what could be done after the intrusion occurred. Fourth Amendment privacy ought not to be re-
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garded as a kind of virginity that is preserved intact or, by definition, utterly gone. It is a way of regulating a relationship between
a citizen and his government. As I suggested in the introductory
section, I think it can properly be said that the kind of "intrusion"
against which the Fourth Amendment was primarily addressed was
not a single but a double one: first, the forced entry and rummaging through one's effects; second, the seizure of one's possessions
and their use against one, in a forfeiture or criminal proceeding.
This is one sense, as the Court in Boyd v. United States9 ' said, in
which the Fourth and Fifth Amendments "run almost into each
other." To put it in dramatic terms: in one case, the right of the
citizen to exclude officials is overridden because of some pressing
necessity of the sort everyone can understand, to put out fires, stop
airplane bombings, halt the spread of disease, and the like, but the
officers may do only what the necessity authorizes. In the other,
entry is gained under the claim of necessity but then what is found
in the course of the "valid search" is used to convict or punish.
Imagine it this way: each one of us has his field of property and
privacy, secure against official intrusion; the necessities of public
01 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Justice Black's concurrence in Mapp v. Ohio-neces-

sary to a firm majority on the constitutional question involved-was expressly based
on the view that the exclusionary rule was not merely a remedy devised to enforce
a constitutional prohibition but emerged from the "close interrelationship" between
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 367 U.S. at 662. The best exposition of the

interrelationship between the principles limiting search and seizure and the principle that a person cannot be compelled to incriminate himself is still the Boyd
case, together with its English forebear Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Trials
1030 (1765). For development of the argument that the Fourth Amendment was

primarily directed against searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions
and forfeitures, see the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959). The contrary view-rejecting the distinction between civil and
criminal searches-is developed in Comment, State Health Inspections and "Un-

reasonable Search": The Frank Exclusion of Civil Searches, 44 MINNm.
L. REv. 513
(1960); Barrett, note 34 supra, at 70-74; LaFave, note 32 supra at 4-5, 36-38. The

major point of these articles is not to claim that the criteria of the warrant clause
should apply to such searches but to suggest that they should be subject to some

substantial constitutional regulation. My proposal is meant to provide a theoretical
basis for such regulation-the first clause of the Amendment-distinct from that for

the regulation of criminal searches, and subject, for the reasons suggested, to different criteria.
I should also say that I think that the general view of the Fourth Amendment
pressed here-that its most basic concern for both the intrusion and the later use
of what is seized in a criminal or forfeiture proceeding-is the correct one. But
agreement on that point is not essential to the proposed suspension of the "plain
view" rule in civil searches, which is also supported-adequately I believe-by the
need for some device to regulate such searches.
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safety require that some invasions upon that field occur on the
basis of general probabilities, and speaking as a group of ideal citizens, we agree that such intrusions should be permitted for those
reasons and we submit to that civil obligation. But to allow the
police to use what they discover in such searches in a criminal case
against the ideally acquiescing citizen involves an unfair shift of
role. It is as if one had lent one's car to the police to drive an injured
person to the hospital and were later charged with possession of the
marijuana seen on the seat by the officer, or with failure to have
a proper inspection sticker. As a matter of ordinary exTectation, the
claim of an emergency implies a simplicity and consistency of relation, a fidelity to premises, which is betrayed by a conversion to
a criminal proceeding.
To say, as some have, that the proposed distinction between civil
and criminal searches cuts the wrong way-to provide greater protection to the criminal than the honest citizen92 seems to me to
misunderstand the special force of the Fourth Amendment and
its connection with the Fifth Amendment and the rest of the Bill
of Rights. It is of course true that the Amendment protects against
"invasions" but it also protects against what can be done after the
invasion has occurred. In Marron v. United States, it was held that
the plain view rule should not apply to searches under warrant 3a
Until Warden v. Hayden, the categories of items that were subject to seizure even pursuant to a legal search were carefully
limited.94 When an intrusion occurs, a Fourth Amendment interest has been invaded; when the fruits of the invasion are used
against one in a criminal proceeding, another "invasion"-to which
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have been thought to speakoccurs. Still another way to put it is this: when the search or seizure
for purposes of the criminal law takes place, the criminal process
has begun. And it has always been accepted that the citizen in that
situation has special safeguards against the power the state proposes to use against him. It is not that the Amendments protect
criminals more than honest people, but that they are meant primarily to regulate the criminal process, not the rational imposition
of obligations of citizenship.
92

This is the thrust of Barrett, note 34 supra.

275 U.S. 192 (1927).
94 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). But see People v. Chiagles, 237
N.Y. 193 (1923), in which Judge Cardozo holds that such limits under New York
law do not apply to searches incident to arrest.
93
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There is another obvious difficulty with my proposal. While
the removal of criminal evidence incentives will tend to regulate
searches incident to arrest and to keep them within proper bounds,
it will not do so with perfect efficiency, and the question remains
what, if anything, is to be done about those cases where it fails to
do so? What additional limits upon the power to search should be
judicially imposed? What shall be done about opening and reading
letters; examination of the contents of wallets and billfolds; body
cavity searches; opening crumpled cigarette packages? Shall there
be any limit at all, or is the adjustment of incentives achieved by
abolition of the plain view rule itself to be regarded as an an adequate regulation? (We are speaking here necessarily of limits imposed in a civil, or perhaps criminal, proceeding against the officer,
since any evidence obtained will by hypothesis be excluded in any
event.) I would suggest that if in a civil proceeding brought by an
arrestee to redress what he regards as an improper search, he can
satisfy the trier of fact that an intrusion took place which was not
honestly intended as a protective search, he should be entitled to
recover damages for a violation of his constitutional rights. 5 The
burden should be on the plaintiff, and great latitude should be afforded the officer's judgment, as no doubt it would be. But the
reading of documents, the examination of pictures, and searches
beyond the area into which the suspect could reach, would be
plainly bad. In Robinson itself, the plaintiff should recover if he
can demonstrate that the officer knowingly failed to employ a
less intrusive and costless alternative to examination of the packet.
On the facts he might or might not be able to do that, and it is
perhaps wrong to claim on what we know of the case that one
result or another is required.
I do not claim that this proposal will work with machinelike
05 One could do worse for a starting point than the statement of the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire in Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482 (1867), whose
general statement of the right to search incident to arrest was relied on by the
Court in Robinson. In a sentence not quoted in Robinson, the New Hampshire
court said: "It must, we think, in a case like this, be a question of fact for the jury,
whether the taking of the property from the prisoner were bona fide, for any purpose indicated above as reasonable and proper, and, of course, justifiable, or whether
it were mala fide, unreasonable, and for an improper and unjustifiable purpose."
Id. at 485. While the standard is framed in terms of good faith or honest purpose,
no doubt the relative reasonableness or unreasonableness of a claimed belief would
properly be considered relevant by any trier of fact asked to determine motive.
No legislation is necessary to permit such civil relief in the federal courts. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), on remand, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
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efficiency to permit all searches that ought to occur and to prevent
all searches that ought not to occur. But no proposal is likely to
do that. It does seem to me that this resolution speaks to the officer
in a way that does justice to the dangers and complexities of his
job, respects his claims to expertise, and provides him with a rule
he can follow, that he may carry on a search reasonably and honestly calculated to produce weapons. To the arrested citizen it
speaks with a very different voice from Robinson. It does require
that he be subjected to intrusions of a kind the general or categorical necessity for which should be plain enough. Yet it protects
him, so far as the law can do so, against searches designed for other
purposes, and against deceit and abuse, by removing the incentive
for improper searches and by providing a remedy for abuse of
power if it occurs. The officer is told that he must be prepared to
explain what he has done in light of the purposes of the authority
he has been granted, but that is no less than he should be expected
to do. The citizen is told that he may recover if he can show that
the authority has been exceeded, which he should be entitled to do.
It is true that successful civil actions will not be numerous, since
they will be inhibited by the cost of suing, the frequent unattractiveness of the plaintiff, and the probable low amount of damages.
But that is true of civil suits now, against both policemen and
other citizens, and perhaps ought to be true. If the intrusion is
not the beginning of the criminal process, the first step in the exercise of the power of the state to try and convict, it seems appropriate that it should be regarded as an ordinary tort, subject to
the usual restrictions on such actions. More than any other alternative, I think this proposal would define the officer and suspect in
ways each could respect, and give maximum recognition to the
legitimate claims on both sides and to the obligation of the court
to subject official behavior to a rule of law.
III. DEFINING

THE CITIZEN IN UNITED STATES V. MATLOCK: THE

PRIVACY OF POSSESSORY AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search
by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that
consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship
to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.9 6
96 United States v. Madock, 415 U.S. 614, 171 (1974).
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A. INTRODUCTION

I have suggested that one way to regard the Court's function
under the Fourth Amendment is to say that it is to regulate the
dramatic relationship between the officer and the citizen by creating a language of adjudication in which each can find a place for
his most compelling claims and interests. The emphasis in Robinson
is on an attempt to talk to the officer with the clarity he legitimately
demands and with a recognition of the imperatives of a repeatedly
dangerous situation that is, through the protean variety of forms
it takes, simply not susceptible to regulation through clear rules.
In Matlock, the emphasis is on the other major participant in the
situation, the suspect, and the general question which the case addresses is how he is to be defined and addressed by the Court. In
what language are the interests or values protected by the Fourth
Amendment to be stated? What notions of security or privacy or
property or autonomy are to be employed, and how are they to be
given meaning? In some cases-Matlock included-there is a complicating second layer of questions. What shall be the treatment
of arrangements made by the individual with others, parcelling
out, sharing, and qualifying whatever it is that is the object of
Fourth Amendment protection? Part of the definition of personal
privacy is what might be called social or communal privacy, the
interest people have in the security of their arrangements for sharing what they have with others. How is this aspect of privacy to
be talked about by the Court?
Another way to put the general problem is to say that the language of the Fourth Amendment must presuppose another language
which can provide a context by which its terms can be given meaning, a way of deciding what "their" houses, papers, and effects are,
and when they have been "searched" or "seized." Is this language
simply to be that of the state law of property? As we have seen,
Olmstead seemed to suggest so, 97 but Katz plainly held that even
where there is no state "property" right there can be a "privacy"
9

7 But perhaps this case can be read differently. It employs a conception of tres-

pass without making explicit reference to state definitions, and it may be that its
conceptions of possession and trespass are constitutional ones. (Of course the case
explicitly disregards the state law prohibiting wiretaps.) This reading of Olmstead
would support the reading of Matlock suggested in the text.
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interested protected by the Fourth Amendment? And surely the
state power to break down the protections of the Fourth Amendment through its property laws-by creating general easements in
favor of the police, defining the interest of tenants in apartments,
hotels, and dormitories as subject to the authority of the manager
to consent to police searches-ought to be subject to some constitutional control. On the other hand, it is plain that to a large extent one's important interests-the elements of one's legal identity
-are created or defined by the state, through its property, contract,
or agency law. Attempts to define "privacy" without reference to
such terms have not been successful in any of the situations in
which that has been attempted. It may be that privacy, like happiness, cannot be talked about directly but only through the use of
other, subsidiary, languages. 9
Matlock involved a common but difficult form of the problem.
Two people have an interest in the same premises. Over the objection of one, the ultimate defendant, the other consents to the
search of the premises and evidence is found that is used against
the ultimate defendant. How shall such cases be analyzed? How
is the authority of the consenter to be defined, justified, and limited? Does it rest, for example, on an implied contract and if so could
an express term the other way negate the authority? Or is it thought
that one occupant is the "agent" of the other, empowered to consent on his behalf? Or does the authority somehow flow directly
from the property or possessory interests that are shared, and if so,
why? Whatever the ground of the authority, what is its scope:
to permit the search of common areas; of each other's bedrooms;
of the contents of desk, bureau, or briefcase?
B. THE MATLOCK CASE: FACTS AND OPINION

The defendant Matlock was validly arrested for bank robbery
in the yard of a house where he lived as a paying boarder, sharing
9

8 But whether there is implicit a notion that the defendant had "possession" of
the telephone booth, with which purely electronic devices interfered as effectively
as a trespass, is less clear. That question would be presented where there was interception of a conversation in the open, for example by a microphone that was
ultrasensitive, operated from long distance, or by one that was planted in a park
bench or telephone pole. The Court has not dealt with such a case.
o9See Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LJ. 475 (1968); Konvitz, Privacy and the Law:
A PhilosophicalPrelude, 31 LAW & CoNAmp. PROB. 272 (1966).
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a room with one Mrs. Graff. The house was rented by the parents
of Mrs. Graff, who also lived there along with several of their
other children. After the arrest, three policemen went to the door
of the house and told Mrs. Graff that they were looking for money
and asked for permission to search the house. Although at trial she
denied it, the lower court found that she consented voluntarily to
the search of the house, including the east bedroom, which she
shared with Matlock. In a diaper bag in the only closet in that
room the police found $4,995, whose admissibility in Matlock's
subsequent trial for bank robbery is at issue here. After the search
she told the policemen that she and Matlock shared the bedroom
and the dresser on a regular basis, and there was testimony that
both she and Matlock had said on several occasions that they were
married.
The lower court excluded the money, because the evidence
proffered to demonstrate Mrs. Graff's authority to consent included
her statements to the police, which were hearsay and therefore
inadmissible to demonstrate the truth of the facts stated, namely,
that the bedroom was shared by Matlock and Mrs. Graff. 100 The
Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice White, reversed on the
grounds that hearsay is not to be automatically excluded from suppression hearings, and that in any event these statements were
against Mrs. Graff's penal interest-since extramarital cohabitation
was a crime-and this lent them additional weight. On the basis of
the evidence in the record the Court believed that the prosecution
had sustained its burden of proving that Mrs. Graff had, as a matter of fact, the authority to make a valid consent to the search of
the east bedroom, but remanded to permit the trial court to make
its own determination of that question. Reaffirming Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte,11 the Supreme Court held that Mrs. Graff's consent was not rendered invalid by the absence of a showing that she
knew or was told that she had the right to refuse. Mr. Justice
100 The lower court held that if a reasonable belief on the part of the officers
in Mrs. Graff's authority would support the search, the statements should be
admissible to demonstrate the existence of such belief, but that since the correct
rule is that the consent is valid only where there is authority in fact, not where
there is merely the appearance of authority, the statements should be excluded.
The Supreme Court did not reach the question of "apparent authority." 415 U.S.
at 177 n.14.
101412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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Douglas dissented on the grounds that a warrant should have been
obtained; Justices Brennan and Marshall, on the grounds that the
remand should have included investigation into the voluntariness
of Mrs. Graff's consent on the theory-which had been repudiated
in Schneckloth-that her consent should be considered invalid unless it were shown that she knew that she had the right to refuse.
What interests me most in this case is the simple principle which
the Court adopts without much comment except to say, accurately
enough, that it has been widely accepted: "[V]oluntary consent
of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly
occupied is valid against the co-occupant...-10 As authority for
this principle, the Court relies upon a large number of lower court
cases and on the opinion by Mr. Justice Marshall in Frazierv. Cupp,
involving the search of a duffel bag which the petitioner had used
jointly with his cousin, Rawls, who had consented to the search:
"Since Rawls was a joint user of the bag, he clearly had authority
to consent to its search."' 1 3 The only explanation or analysis of
04
the rule in Matlock appears in a foomote:
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the
mere property interest a third party has in the property. The
authority which justifies third-party consent does not rest
upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and
legal refinements ... but rests rather on mutual use of the
property by persons generally having joint access or control
for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that
any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection
in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that
one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched.
These statements, which meet with nearly universal acceptance on
the Court, seem to me to raise important and difficult questions
which deserve extensive consideration.
What is the basis of the authority of one person who has an
interest in or relationship with particular premises to consent to
their search by police seeking evidence against another person
who also has some interest or relationship in the premises? Is this
authority rooted in the consent of the ultimate defendant, some
legal relationship between them, or in considerations of policy?
102 415 U.S. at 169.
103 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).

104 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
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How are the scope of the authority, and the nature of the "interest" or "relationship" necessary to give rise to it, to be defined?
What is the proper place, if any, of state law of property, contract,
and agency in analyzing these questions? What role and definition,
if any, should be given to a federal constitutional law of "privacy,"
grounded in Katz and Griswold?10 5
C. EXPLICATION DU TEXTE

In what follows I am interested in trying to work out what seem
to be the bases and implications of the Court's rather lapidary
statements quoted above. Its basic rule seems to me to be right,
although I suggest one or two ways in which its implications
might have led to modification of the result in Matlock. The principles and attitudes which seem to underlie and justify the rule employed here have far-reaching consequences for the ways in which
the protections of the Fourth Amendment are to be defined.
1. The basis of the joint-occupant's authority: "consent" or
"possession"? Upon what basis does the authority of the joint occupant rest? Is it rooted in the ultimate defendant's own consent, or
does it emerge from the fact of shared possession, or can it be explained in some other way?
We can begin by putting aside two extreme cases. First, it is
plain enough that if the consenter is the only person with an interest in the premises-that is, if the person against whom the search
is directed is a trespasser-his authority to consent to the search
is absolute. But in such a case the ultimate defendant would lack
standing to object even if the search were wholly invalid. 10 6 At
the other end of the scale, it is apparently the case that if the consenter has no interest, real or apparent, in the premises, he cannot
validly consent to the search under any circumstances. 7
It appears that, as the Court conceives it, the authority of the
105 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

100 Jones v. United States, 362 US. 257 (1960).
107 It seems to be accepted, however, that if such a person carries out the search
himself, without prior arrangement with the police, the evidence taken would be
admissible on the grounds that there was no state action and hence no Fourth
Amendment violation. I am not sure that this proposition should be so easily
accepted: certainly there can be a kind of after-the-fact ratification of the trespassory conduct by the police; and there is the jurisdictionally necessary state action
in the use of the evidence at trial.
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joint occupant to make a valid consent to a search directed against
the ultimate defendant is of a peculiar, hybrid sort. It does not
rest upon the immediate or express consent of the defendant to
the existence or exercise of that specific power; yet it is grounded
in the voluntary action of the defendant in entering that relationship, and the conduct which gives rise to the authority in another
must no doubt be free. There is no intimation in Matlock or the
other joint occupancy cases that the result would be different if
the parties had expressly agreed that neither could authorize the
search of the premises, or if the defendant, present and objecting,
formally revoked whatever authority he is held to have earlier
given. The authority arises, it is said, in some conclusory and irrevocable way from the fact of joint occupancy itself. But on what
proper basis can the Court-or the state-give such unintended
consequences to the defendant's conduct? If the authority to consent to a search is not grounded in the consent of the defendant,
what is it grounded in and how can its scope be determined?
Perhaps comparison with another set of cases may make clear
the peculiarity of the Court's treatment of joint occupancy. When
the Court says that the authority to consent depends upon "mutual
use" and not a "mere property interest," it suggests that the cases in
which property interests, but not possession, are shared would be
decided differently. Suppose, for example, it is asserted that a landlord who has rented a house or apartment has the authority, by
virtue of state law or the nature of his relationship with the premises
and the tenant, to consent to a police search of the premises; or it is
argued that a hotel or motel clerk has similar powers with respect
to the rooms in the building. 08 How are these cases to be analyzed?
Presumably, of course, an authority to consent to a search could
rest on the genuine consent of the ultimate defendant, if there were,
for example, an agreement between him and the landlord giving the
latter an irrevocable authority to search or to consent to a police
search. Such an authority might in fact be bargained for, serving
much the same purpose as a damage deposit, and a police search
consented to pursuant to such an agreement, at least if carried on for
the purposes contemplated by the parties when they established
the authority, would be valid even against a contemporaneously ob108 Cases which suggest these questions, but propose no analysis of them, are
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), and Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483 (1964).
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jecting tenant. But could such an authority be raised by operation
of law upon the fact of tenancy, without regard to the existence of
actual consent, as it apparently is in the joint occupancy case? Suppose for example that a state statute-either by direct mandate or
by providing that leases shall be so constried "unless otherwise
agreed"-gives the landlord the right to enter the premises at any
time, or to authorize the police to do so, or that a statutory provision
gives similar powers to a hotel clerk. Or consider another variant.
Exercising a power established by state law, a motel keeper gives
the police permission to enter a room still occupied after checkout
time, when the tenant's right to remain has expired; or a landlord
does so with respect to an apartment where the rent is overdue. 10 9
While the landlord and hotel clerk cases have not been decided
by the Court, it seems plain that there is thought to be a substantial
distinction between them and the joint occupancy cases, based upon
the fact that in the latter there is a sharing of possession." Indeed,
in stating the landlord and hotel cases I have asked whether creation
of the authority to consent by state law would be valid. In Matlock
the Supreme Court does not rely upon state law defining the rights
and powers of co-possessors, but itself declares that the authority to
consent arises from the fact of shared possession. How can this peculiar treatment of the shared possession cases be explained? The
Court seems to declare that one who has chosen to share possession
with another has, as a matter of constitutional law, placed this aspect
of his privacy irrevocably in the hands of the joint occupant, without regard to any express or implied contractual terms between
them-surely the usual term of any such agreement would be to
prohibit, not authorize, consent to police searches-and without explaining why the authority to consent should not be subject, like
other aspects of legal and property relations, to the power of contract. If the ultimate defendant can exclude whom he wishes, and
limit by contract the landlord's power to permit a search, as he presumably can, why can he not share premises on the express or im109 See United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Abbarno, 342 F. Supp. 599 (W.D. N.Y. 1972); cf. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48 (1951); United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1972).
110 While the Court has not explicitly addressed the landlord or hotel clerk cases

in their purest form, it is plain that they are regarded as presenting difficulties that
are absent in the joint occupancy cases. In both Stoner and Chapman the searches
were held invalid; the question avoided was what the impact would have been of
a state law authorizing the clerk or landlord to search.
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plied condition that the other person never authorize a search?
One way to approach the matter would be to say that no "reasonable expectation of privacy" within the Katz terminology can be
grounded on a contractual arrangement whose purpose is to promote, commit, or conceal a crime. But that does not really distinguish the tenant's power to limit by contract the power of the landlord, which may be exercised for such purposes too, or the sole possessor's power to exclude the universe, which he is entitled to do for
any reason at all. What seems to me critical to the shared possession
cases is that the paradigmatic situation of officer and citizen has been
expanded to include another person who has himself a role to play,
if he chooses to do so, as an interested and cooperative citizen, and
it is thought important in our interest as well as his to keep him free
to play that role. He may be moved by public spirit, by a desire to
dissociate himself from risk, or other motives, but the Court's rule
is designed to leave him free to make the choice himself. What this
amounts to is a constitutional definition of the joint occupant as a
citizen whose freedom to act in his own or the public interest by
permitting a police search cannot-as a matter of constitutional lawbe limited by contract. The defendant is entitled, on this analysis,
not to the enforcement of a promise or understanding not to exercise
the power, but to have the other person himself freely make that
decision.
Under this view, which seems implicit in Matlock, the sharing of
possession is the critical act that changes the relationship between
the parties and creates the authority to consent in the joint occupant.
Where the ultimate defendant has not chosen to share possession, he
would presumably be secure from police intrusion except where
either: (a) the warrant and probable cause requirements, or other
usual Fourth Amendment criteria for a forcible search, are met; or
(b) he has in a knowing and voluntary way consented to the establishment of an authority in another person to permit searches. This
way of looking at these cases makes "possession" a term of constitutional law, used to define part of the context against which the
words "search" and "seizure" can be given meaning. It would disregard the state law of property affecting the conditions of possession except insofar as such provisions of state law might be used to
support a claim of consent in fact. In cases where possession is not
shared, the right to authorize police entry would have to rest upon
actual consent, not provisions of state law. The wrongful possessor
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could of course be ejected from possession-when he fails to pay the
rent or hangs on after checkout time-and no doubt state force
might be employed for such a purpose. But he would retain a
Fourth Amendment right against searches for other purposes and
searches more extensive than those necessary for the ejection.
The use of shared possession as the critical fact in establishing
the authority in a third party to consent is of course to some extent
conclusory. The landlord, the remainderman, the neighbor, may
also be said to have interests in the premises and in the investigation
of crime. But the possession criterion has the merit of using a wellestablished and reasonably clear language to define both a centrally
protected Fourth Amendment interest and the conditions under
which one's power to exclude the universe is limited by being
shared. This is a way of giving meaning to the word "their" in the
phrase, "their house, papers, and effects" and establishing a way of
talking about different kinds and degrees of sharing which will involve a minimum of interference with the accepted language of
state legal systems and the expectations of private parties.
How should the Court deal with a case in which the consenting
third party does not in fact share possession, or have any other
actual authority to consent, but in which the police reasonably
believe him to be a copossessor or otherwise to have such authority? Since the analysis I propose is not a way of assessing the reasonableness of police conduct but a way of defining legitimate expectations of privacy, a search pursuant to such a consent could not
be valid unless it is the conduct of the defendant himself that has
given rise to the appearance of authority. This rule would present
a problem for the police only where they had sufficient probable
cause to obtain a warrant and were undecided whether to proceed
under the consent or to seek a warrant. In such cases the proposed rule would make them favor the warrant mechanism, which
should be preferred in any event.
What is proposed here is a test both for determining when an
authority to consent exists and for determining the scope of such
an authority. It should go no further than the degree to which possession is shared in fact. Common areas of an apartment, for example, will normally be shared completely; bedrooms, closets, bureaus,
and the like may or may not be; suitcases, briefcases, letters, files
will most often not. But in each case the inquiry ought to be into
the arrangements made between the occupants in fact, and their
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disposition of possessory rights ought to be controlling. In Matlock,
for example, the bedroom had only one closet and this was shared
by Mrs. Graff and the defendant; her consent to the search of that
closet should therefore be permissible. We do not know what the
arrangement was with respect to the diaper bag-it may have been
among the effects not jointly used-and the remand order in Matlock should accordingly have required determination of that fact.
2. What is the constitutional relevance of the joint occupant's
consent? I now want to address another peculiarity of the rule that
gives the joint possessor the authority to consent, without regard
to the expectations of the ultimate defendant or any contractual relations between the two. To the extent that the Court makes the
validity of the search depend upon the voluntariness of the consent
given by the third party it creates and protects a Fourth Amendment interest of a kind it has never explicated or defined, what
might be called a sort of social privacy. One can ask, after all, what
constitutional interest the ultimate defendant-who has created this
authority in another-can be said to have in seeing that it is exercised voluntarily rather than through deceit or duress? If we say
that the ultimate defendant has exposed this segment of his privacy
to invasion, of what constitutional significance is it to him that the
invasion takes place through the consent of the third party or
through some other route?
What seems necessarily implied in the requirement of voluntary
consent is that the ultimate defendant has a right, protectable by
the Fourth Amendment, to have the person in whom he has created
the authority himself decide how to exercise it. The person with
whom he has made the arrangement is the repository, as it were, of
his privacy, and while the defendant is not protected against the
free choice on the part of such a person to exercise that power
against him, it seems implicit in the Court's analysis that he has a
constitutionally protectable stake that that choice be free.
What this suggests is that where the joint occupant himself decides to initiate the search, by calling the police, or where-upon
being informed by the police or otherwise of all relevant facts, presumably including his right to refuse-he agrees to the search at
police request, the search will be valid."' If the consent is not free
111 The distinction between searches initiated by the police and those initiated
by the joint occupant is articulated and elaborated in Comment, Third-Party
Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysis, 41 U. Cm. L. Rav. 121, 135-40 (1973).
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and informed it should be held invalid, even if there is authority to
make such a consent. This does not tell us how "free and informed"
the choice need be, but I think that this inquiry should involve
much more than the question, obviously involved, whether the police have engaged in uncivilized tactics or methods to secure the
consent, for more is involved here than the interest of the consenter
against unfair pressure or abuse. At stake is the ultimate defendant's
own interest in the security of the private relationships he is entitled
to establish. The Court's opinion in Matlock, which disposes of the
matter by merely saying that "voluntariness" is a matter of fact,
that no knowledge of the right to refuse need affirmatively be
shown, while correct so far as it goes, is too curt to do justice to
the problem presented. How is voluntariness to be measured? What
should be the relevance of police promises of leniency or threats of
harshness? Suppose the defendant can show that the consenter did
not know he was free to refuse, or thought he was obliged to grant
the permission requested? 112 These are not side issues, but squarely
raise a question of major Fourth Amendment concern. What protection is to be afforded the network of private relationships that
make up our ordinary social world?
3. Connections zwith the secret agent cases. I should like now
to explore some connections between the joint occupancy case and
the highly problematic secret agent cases, which can be said to present another aspect of the right to social privacy. The connections
I suggest will not make the difficulties of these cases disappear, but
I think they may uncover some important lines of concern and
perhaps suggest a way of talking about Fourth Amendment interests that has even wider application.
Let us start with the case in which the secretary of an employer
reports incriminating information to the police. If there is no prior
relationship with the police, it is said that there is no state action and
hence no Fourth Amendment problem, no matter what contractual or
112 It is important to note that the decision in Schnecklot was a "narrow one,"
bearing only on what ihe Government need prove as part of its case to establish
the voluntariness of consent: "[W]hile the subjecet's knowledge of a right to refuse
is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate
such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent." 412 U.S. at
249. What this amounts to is a sensible refusal to extend to this field the "warning"
requirements of Miranda. But it leaves open what the effect should be of a persuasive showing by the defendant of ignorance of the right to refuse. It does
not tell us what weight should be given the "factor" it declares relevant.
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statutory provision the secretary may have violated in revealing the
information."3 Suppose after giving some information to the police
the secretary returns, under an agreement with them, to obtain more.
Here the secretary is presumably a state agent, and if he searched
beyond the zone connected with his employment, that is to say beyond the zone established by his employer's consent, it would be
4
an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment."
But may he continue to report what he discovers in the ordinary
course of his employment? Presumably so, since he has simply exercised the power the employer has placed in his hands to communicate incriminating information to the police. In revealing the information, the Court has said, the employer "runs the risk" that it
will be carried further." 5 Presumably it would be irrelevant that the
employee had promised him never to tell anyone what he learned,
and irrelevant to say that the employer had never consented to the
revelation. If these cases are decided as I suggest, can there be a
Fourth Amendment violation when the police arrange with a secretarial company to have a policeman sent over the next time the defendant asks for a secretary, in order to spy on him, insofar as he
can do so without making any searches beyond those normally
entailed in the job? Or take the standard meterman hypothetical. If
the man from the gas company may report to the police what he
saw in my cellar when he checked the meter, and may arrange with
them to make similar reports in the future, does it follow that the
"meterman" may in fact be a police officer, planted by agreement
with the gas company, to discover what he can during a routine
meter-reading? Or the hotel maid. If she can report what she sees,
or can be persuaded by the police so to report, can the "maid"
be a policewoman who will discover what she can of my affairs
when she engages in a routine cleaning of the room? (In all cases,
assume that the planted official takes no action, opens no drawer or
file, examines no object, that a person normally performing the
function in question would not do.)
113 As suggested above in note 107, it seems to me that in extreme cases at least

a doctrine of ratification might be employed to prevent the use of evidence obtained
in an illegal way.
114 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
115 The most complete elaboration of the "risk" analysis, as applied to secret
agent cases, appears in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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I would like to suggest that there are critical differences between
the cases in which the actual employee or maid or meterman chooses
to cooperate as a police agent and those in which he or she is from
the beginning a plant. In the first place, the planting procedure will
produce in gross a larger number of intrusions and increase the
sense of general vulnerability to such exposure.:" 6 Second, to validate domestic espionage would radically change the sort of relationship a person may have with those with whom he deals in the
ordinary course of living. Instead of asking how likely it is that this
independent person, this ordinary secretary or maid or meterman,
may be persuaded to act for the police, he must ask how likely it
is that this apparent secretary or meterman or maid is really an
official in disguise. This requires him to make a judgment about
others wholly different from any we normally think of ourselves
as having to make, for one must not only assess the likelihood that
such-and-such a person will prove loyal, but the likelihood that
the person with whom one is dealing is a skilled professional dissembler, able to manufacture the usual indicia of reliability. This would
uproot one's confidence to estimate risks, judge character, and protect by good social judgment one's privacy even while working in
a cooperative or communal way. And this sense of sudden uncertainty is introduced into the lives not only of those engaged in
crime but those in whose activities the police may be thought to
have any interest, including political and social organizations. 117
One way to define what would be protected here is to call it an
interest in the ordinariness of social life."18 Finally, there is another
important distinction between the two classes of cases, based on
the interests of the reporter. In the case where a person has decided
116 This is a factor that should have been considered in Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967), which greatly increased the sorts of items that can be the object of
-and therefore the occasion for-a search. It is given weight in Justice Harlan's
dissent in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745. The major thrust of that opinion is
the second point mentioned above, i.e., the effect of a rule upon the general sense of
security and privacy, which Justice Harlan rightly regards as one of the important
objects of Fourth Amendment concern.
117 As I suggest below, the use of such agents might well be appropriate if regulated by the warrant and probable cause criteria.
118 In his analysis of these cases, which differs somewhat from mine as to result,
Professor Weinreb uses a similar terminology to explain the interest in social privacy that is at stake. Weinreb, The Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, to be
published in volume 42 of the University of Chicago Law Review.
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to help the police rather than the suspicious person with whom the
prior relations exist, both we as the public and he as a person have
a strong interest in having his freedom of choice protected, just as
we do with that of the joint occupant. The third person added to
the drama has claims and interests that arise independently of the
struggle between the defendant and the officer. In the "plant" case
those interests disappear. We have only the officer, whose interest
is in investigating crime in an official way, and he has no independent interest in a freedom to choose how to exercise a power
that has come upon him in the course of his ordinary experience.
This analysis would leave untouched two classical secret agent
cases. In Lewis v. United States,119 the agent, pretending to be a
buyer of marijuana, telephoned the defendant at his home and arranged to buy some marijuana from him. In such a case there should
be no Fourth Amendment violation when the agent enters the house
to make a purchase, because the only ordinariness of life that would
be so protected is the expectation that an apparent criminal is what
he appears to be. More traditional ways to put the point would be
to say that no "reasonable" expectation of privacy can be grounded
on an implicit or explicit representation by a stranger that he is
indeed a criminal. To permit such deceptions will, after all, expose
to police spying only those people who express to strangers a willingness to engage in criminal activity. The ordinary citizen can be
secure, so far as the law can make him secure, from such intrusions. 12 0 In Hoffa v. United States121 the defendant did not immediately reveal his criminal purposes to the secret agent, but in that
case the agent was personally known to the defendant from prior
transactions. The situation is thus analogous to that where the secretary decides to give the police information, not to the one where
he is a planted spy to begin with. The people you know, that is,
may decide to report, on an occasional or systematic basis, what
you reveal to them. But with respect to relationships with others
that are not criminal in their inception, one should be entitled to
119 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
120 It is this criterion upon which Justice Harlan would have relied to hold
the use of "bugged informers" invalid in United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 787.
Although Justice Harlan did not say so, it seems to me that the reasoning of that
opinion would lead to Fourth Amendment control of secret agents at least in the
situations, and to the extent, suggested in this article.
121

385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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the protection of one's ordinary expectation as to their identity. 122

After that one chooses one's risks.
The interest in the ordinariness of life I suggest here is not meant
to be absolute, for no Fourth Amendment interest is absolute. If

the probable cause and specificity requirements of the warrant
clause are met, such agents can be planted. The security this would
give the citizen is that he would know that his world was what it
seemed to be, unless he established relationships on criminal premises, and subject to the possibility of (a) revelations by free choice
and (b) intrusions subject to judicial control under the standards
of the Fourth Amendment. This would leave the ordinary citizen

secure in his ordinary expectations of life and provide an important
protection to the privacy of social relations.
IV. CONCLUSION

One way to regard United States v. Robinson is as a response
to the wholly understandable plea from the officer for rules of
conduct which recognize the critical dangers and uncertainties of
searches incident to arrest and which are clear enough so that they
may be followed. I have tried to show that the Robinson automatic
search rule fails to achieve this result. Since the basis of the rule
it establishes is unclear, so must be its scope, and instead of clarifying, it introduces a principle of confusion into the law. The
price it exacts is the practical abandonment of the requirement
of justification which is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment
tradition. A better way to meet the legitimate requirements of the
arresting officer would be to assimilate the search incident to arrest-insofar as it is a search for weapons and not evidence-to the
civil search cases, where searches have been justified upon the basis
of general and not particular probabilities under a standard of reasonableness rather than the criteria of th7 warrant clause. To limit
the nature of the emergency intrusion, and to ensure that the opportunity is not abused for other reasons, I suggest that in such a
case the "plain view" principle not apply. And the intrusion should
not go beyond what is honestly thought necessary for self-protection, this limit to be enforced by civil action.
122

For a somewhat similar suggestion as to result, see Kitch, Katz v. United

States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 SuPREamm CouRT Ravmw 133,
151-52.
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Matlock articulates another general rule, this one granting authority to a "joint occupant" to consent to the search of premises
or effects jointly possessed, even over the objection of the ultimate
defendant, and presumably notwithstanding any contrary agreement with him. I have tried to explain this rule, which seems to
me right, by suggesting that (a) the Fourth Amendment centers
its protections in property cases on the possessory interest, and (b)
where the defendant chooses to share possession he establishes rights
and interests in the joint occupant which are themselves constitutionally cognizable, including the interest in behaving as he will
with what is his. The defendant's right is not to have total privacy
or secrecy but to have the joint occupant himself exercise the
choice, in an informed and voluntary way, as to what he will do
with that segment of the defendant's privacy of which he is the
repository. Matlock seems right in its general principle but wrong
in failing to require a more precise inquiry into the scope of the
possession and hence of the authority to consent to search, and in
treating the voluntariness of the consent as if it were a simple matter of fact, without establishing workable criteria for its establishment or refutation.
This analysis suggests a line of connection with the secret agent
cases, with respect to which I suggest a limitation on the use of
such agents to cases in which (a) a private citizen makes the choice
to function as an agent in a preexisting relationship, or (b) the relationship is criminal from its inception, or (c) the warrant, probable
cause, and specificity requirements are met. Such a limitation would
permit the use of agents but leave the ordinary citizen secure in
his ordinary expectations of life; it would protect in this context,
as Matlock should in the joint possession case, both the ultimate
defendant's interest in the privacy of his social relations and the
consenting person's right to do with his own what he will.

